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WHERE THE LAW ENDS -'PART 2
A CEREMONIAL APPROACH TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN TA CKETT AND
REESE
RogerJ. McClow*
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VI.
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VII.
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VIII. POSTSCRIPT

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 20, 2018, in a per curiam decision, CNHIndustrialLLC
v. Reese, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Sixth Circuit's split
decision in favor of a class of about four thousand retirees and spouses.'
Citing its 2015 decision in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett,2 the
Court held that, as a matter of law, the retirees' right to health care benefits
did not survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agreements
*Roger J. McClow - B.A. with distinction, 1969, University of Michigan; J.D. magna cum laude,
1976, Wayne State University Law School - was a partner in the Southfield, Michigan law firm
Klimist, McKnight, Sale, McClow & Canzano, P.C. until 2008 and of counsel to McKnight, Canzano,
Smith, Radtke & Brault, P.C. until 2016. He was class counsel for the retirees in the Fox, Golden and
Yolton litigation and class counsel for the Reese retirees until 2016. He filed an amicus brief on behalf
of the Fox, Golden and Yolton Retiree Committees in Tackett. With Stuart M. Israel, he wrote Retiree
Health Care andReese v. CNH America - The Beginning of the End of ContractLaw as We Know
It? 59 WAYNE L. REv. 412 (2013). He is the author of Where the Law Ends -Part 1: M&G Polymers
v. Tackett and CNH Industrialv. Reese - FederalLaborPolicy, the Interpretationof Collective BargainingAgreements, andthe Failureof Stare Decisis, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV.
141 (2019). The author wants to express his appreciation to Stuart Israel for his extensive and insightful review of an earlier draft of this article.
1. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018) (hereinafter Reese).
2. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 427 (2015).
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under which they had retired. 3 The Supreme Court considered the issue,
that
under "ordinary principles of contract law," as so "straightforward"
4
unnecessary.
was
merits
the
briefing and oral argument on
5
After fifteen years of intense litigation in two related cases, during
which three decades of collective bargaining history were explored, more
than 145,000 documents produced and catalogued, more than 1300 docket
entries filed, more than 60 depositions taken and dozens of orders entered
on procedural and substantive issues, the Supreme Court discovered all of
6
this litigation had all been pointless. The dispositive answer had been in
plain sight all along. Case New Holland (hereinafter "CNH")' a multibillion-dollar manufacturer of tractors and agricultural equipment won,
the
saving it hundreds of millions of dollars; its former employees lost
labor. 8
industrial
of
decades
through
earned
had
they
retirement security
As might be expected after such extensive litigation, nothing about
this case was "straightforward" - an issue this article explores. As important, in Tackett, the Supreme Court engaged in a "ceremonial" approach to contract interpretation, selectively identifying only some "ordinary principles" of contract interpretation and emphasizing textual factors
9
while ignoring or minimizing contextual ones. This permitted the
3. Reese, 583 U.S._, 138 S.Ct. at 766.
4. Id. at 766.
5. See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 2006) (involving a
class of retirees, and their spouses, who retired from CNI before a July 1, 1994 reorganization and
who
initial public offering (IPO)); Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. at 761 (involving a class of retirees
retired thereafter, under the same and later CBAs).
6. The district court's docket sheet in Yolton contains 470 filings, including about 98 orders.
Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.). The district court's docket sheet
in Reese contains 472 filings, including about 94 orders. Reese v. CNI Indus. N.V., No. 04-07592
(E.D. Mich.). The Sixth Circuit's docket sheet in Yolton, contains 136 filings. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn.
Pipeline Co., 04-1182 (6th Cir.). The docket sheets in the three appeals to the Sixth Circuit in Reese
contain a total of 250 filings. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 08-1302 (6th Cir.) (80 filings); Reese
15v. CNH America LLC, No. 11-1359 (6th Cir.) (81 filings); Reese v. CNH Industrial N.V., No.
all
2382 (6th Cir.) (89 filings). The author maintains a combined Summation document database for
Bates-stamped documents produced in Yolton and Reese and for depositions taken in those cases.
indiThat database contains 145,496 documents and the transcripts of the depositions of 66 separate
viduals.
7. CNH is the company, which resulted from the 1999 merger between Case Corporation and
Case
New Holland. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 574. The 1998 CBA, and prior CBAs, were actually between
which
Co.,
Case
J.I.
as
known
was
Corporation
Corporation and the UAW. Id. Prior to 1990, Case
was originally founded in 1842. Id. Prior to the 1994 initial public offering (IPO), Case Corporation
was wholly owned by Tenneco (later El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Company and now KinderMorgan).
Id. Throughout this article, Case will be referred to as CNH or Case Corporation.
8. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. at 764, 767.
9. According to Farnsworth, the application of rules of contract interpretation "is often more
ceremonial (as being decorative rationalizations of decisions already reached on other grounds) than
can often
persuasive (as moving the court toward a decision not yet reached) ....Indeed, a court

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol37/iss1/5

4

McClow: Where the Law Ends - Part 2: A Ceremonial Approach to the Interpr
WHERE THE LAW ENDS

2019]

Supreme Court in.Reese to short-circuit the contractual inquiry, based on
faulty contract analysis applied to a fictional factual premise. As a result,
Reese never focused on (or attempted to determine) the actual intent of
the parties. Instead, Reese held that one selected provision of the 1998
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter "CBA") in isolation foreclosed any such inquiry.
II. TA CKETT, REESE AND "ORDINARY PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW"
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINIONIN TACKETT

If anything can be taken from Tackett with certainty, it is that collective bargaining agreements must be interpreted "according to ordinary
principles of contract law." 10 While noting Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills1 1 for the proviso that.this is true "at least when those principles are
not inconsistent with federal labor policy, 12 the Court proceeded to ignore decades of Supreme Court precedent holding unequivocally that
CBAs are not "ordinary contracts" and that the "same old rules" that apply
to ordinary contracts do not apply to CBAs. 13
Three years later, Reese expunged the federal labor policy proviso
from the governing principle and cited Tackett for the completely erroneous proposition that: "This Court has long held that collective-bargaining
agreements must be interpreted 'according to ordinary principles of con14
tract law."'
This article focuses on whether Tackett, as amplified by Reese, actually employed "ordinary principles" of contract interpretation or, instead,
applied those rules ceremonially, fashioning an almost irrebuttable presumption againstthe vesting of collectively bargained healthcare benefits,
a presumption entirely at odds with traditional contract principles and,
select from among pairs of opposing or countervailing rules that seem to conflict .
E. ALLAN
F NSWORTH, CONTRACTS 456-57 (4th ed.2004).
10. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427,435 (2015).
11. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1957).
.12. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.
13. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 311 (1989); see Transportation-Communication Emps. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 161 (1966); John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); Roger J. McClow, Where the Law Ends
"-Part 1: M&G Polymers v. Tackett and CNH Industrialv. Reese - FederalLabor Policy, the Interpretation of Collective BargainingAgreements, and the FailureofStare Decisis, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS
& SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 141 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to follow the doctrine
of stare decisis).
14. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. __,138 S.Ct. 761, 763 (2018).
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consequently, contrary to the fundamental judicial objective in contract
cases - to discern the actual intent of the contracting parties.
After paying lip service to federal labor policy, Tackett cited the ordinary principle that, "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions
control." 15 The Court then quoted Williston on Contracts for the "plain
meaning" rule that: "Where the words of a contract in writing are clear
is to be ascertained in accordance with its
and unambiguous, its meaning
16
intent."
expressed
plainly
Tackett granted certiorari to address the issue of whether the Sixth
Circuit in UAWv. Yard-Man, had improperly fashioned an inference from
the context of collective bargaining and the status of retirees that sup17
ported its finding that retiree healthcare benefits had vested. On this issue, the Court stated: "As an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary
contract principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested reThat rule has no batiree benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements.
18
law."
contract
of
principles
ordinary
sis in
Citing Williston, the Court held that the Yard-Man inference "distorts
the attempt 'to ascertain the intention of the parties' and its "assessment
of likely behavior in collective bargaining is too speculative and too far
removed from the context of any particular contract to be useful in discerning the parties' intention."19
Tackett criticized Yard-Man for deriving its assessment of likely behavior "from its own suppositions about the intentions of employees, unions, and employers negotiating retiree benefits," not from record evidence. 20 While Tackett recognized that customs or usages in a particular
industry were relevant in discerning the meaning of a contract, the Court
held that any such practices must be proven through affirmative evidence
in a given case, not, as in Yard-Man, "indiscriminately across industries."21

Tackett stated that Yard-Man inferences rest on "a shaky factual
foundation," that is, on the premises that: 1) retiree healthcare benefits are

15.

Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S.

662, 682 (2010)).

16. Id. (quoting 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 30:6 at 108 (2012)).
17. UAW v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
18. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 438.
19. Id.at 438-39 (quoting 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30:2 at 18 (2012)).
20. Id. at 439.
21. Id.
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permissive rather than mandatory subjects of bargaining;2 2 and 2) those
benefits are a form of deferred compensation, a characterization that is,
according to Tackett, "contrary to Congress' determination otherwise., 23
Tackett noted that, in Yard-Man and subsequent decisions, the Sixth
Circuit refused to give any weight to contract provisions that supported a
conclusion contrary to vesting, such as a general termination clause. 2 4
Citing Story and Williston, Tackett stated that "[t]hese decisions distort
the text of the agreement and conflict with the principle of contract law
that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the whole agreement
25
of the parties."
Similarly, Tackett criticized Yard-Man's purported application of the
illusory promises rule.2 6 According to Tackett, the CBA promises were
not, by definition, "illusory" because they benefited some classes of retirees, if not all classes of retirees equally.2 7 If a CBA benefits some class of
retirees, that is sufficient to "serve as consideration for the Union's promises." 28 The Court further states that Yard-Man's interpretation ignores
that CBAs are negotiated on behalf of a broad category of individuals and
will necessarily include "provisions inapplicable to some category of em29
ployees."
Additionally, the Court in Tackett asserted that the Sixth Circuit
"failed even to consider the traditional principle that courts should not
construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises., 30 "Contracts
that are silent as to their duration will ordinarily be treated not as 'operative in perpetuity' [but only for] a reasonable time.",3 1 According to the
22. Id.at 439 ("Parties, however, can and do voluntarily agree to make retiree benefits a subject
of mandatory collective bargaining. Indeed, the employer and union in this case entered such an
agreement in 2001.").
23. Id. (citing Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1002(2)(A)(ii) (defining plans resulting in a deferral of income as pension, not welfare benefit plans)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 440 (citing 1 W. STORY, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 780 (M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1874);
see also 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§
31:5 at 470-71 (2012) Section 31.5 of 1IWilliston is entitled "Courts May Not Rewrite the Contract."
The Court gave no page citation and this section does not appear to support the principle for which it
is cited. And, as noted elsewhere, this "ordinary" contract principle is contrary to Supreme Court
precedent that the common law of the shop is equally a part of a collective bargaining agreement even
though not expressed in the written agreement. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
26. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 436.
27. Id.at 440-41.
28. Id at 441.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE
TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 553 at 216 (1960)).
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Court, there was a "stark contrast" between the Sixth Circuit's treatment
of collectively bargained and non-collectively bargained retiree
healthcare benefits. 32 In Sprague v. GeneralMotors Corp., the Sixth Cirthe emcuit held that, for non-collectively bargained benefits to vest, 33
From
language."
express
and
clear
in
"stated
ployer's intent must be
types
two
these
of
treatment
this, Tackett concluded that "[t]he different
orfrom
Yard-Man's deviation
of employment contracts only underscores
34
law."
dinary principles of contract
The Court in Tackett cited Litton FinancialPrintingDiv. v. NLRB
for "the traditional principle that 'contractual obligations will cease, in the
ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement"' and for
the proposition that "a collective bargaining agreement ... provid[es] in
explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration. ' '3 5 But, Tackett concluded: "When a contract is silent as to the duramay not infer that the parties intended those
tion of retiree benefits, a court
36
benefits to vest for life."
As to the case before it, Tackett stated that "[t]here is no doubt that
37
Yard-Man and its progeny affected the outcome here." Tackett noted
that the Sixth Circuit referenced "the context of ... labor-management
negotiations" and reasoned that the union likely would not have agreed to
language providing for a "full Company contribution" for retiree
38
of that contribution.
healthcare if the company could change the level
Tackett criticized the Sixth Circuit for concluding "that the tying of eligiof pension benefits suggested an
bility for health care benefits to receipt
39
benefits."
care
health
vest
intent to
Tackett concluded: "We reject the Yard-Man inferences as incon40
sistent with ordinary principles of contract law." But, recognizing it was
"court to apply
the court of final review, the Court remanded to the lower
41
instance."
first
the
in
law
contract
of
ordinary principles

32. Id.
33. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998).
34. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441.
35. Id. at 441-42 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 443.
39. Id. at 442. In particular, Tackett criticized Noe v. PolyOne Corp., which held "that a proviroom
sion that ties eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for a pension... leaves little
PolyOne
v.
Noe
(quoting
438
at
Id.
retirement."
upon
vest
for debate that retirees' health benefits
Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 2008)).
40. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 442.
41. Id
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B. THE TACKETT CONCURRENCE

The four-member ,Tackett concurrence agreed that the majority's
"decision rightly holds that courts must apply ordinary contract principles,
shom of presumptions, to determine whether retiree health-care benefits
survive the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. 42 But, it
pointed out that, according to Williston, "[u]nder the 'cardinal principle'
of [ordinary] contract interpretation, 'the intention of the parties, to be
gathered from the whole instrument, must prevail.' ' 43 In, determining
what the parties intended, "a court must examine the entire agreement in
light of relevant industry-specific 'customs, practices, usages, and terminology.'"44 When intent is "unambiguously expressed in the contract, that
expression controls;" but when a contract is unambiguous, a court may
45
consider extrinsic evidence.
The concurrence clarified that "clear and convincing" evidence of
vesting is not required, noting that Litton held that "' [c]onstraints upon
the employer after the expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement'

. . .

may be derived from the agreement's 'explicit terms,' but they

'may arise as well from ... implied terms of the expired agreement. ,,,46
The concurrence concluded by reminding the parties that the CBA was
not silent -as to duration. 47 The CBA contained language that retirees will
receive healthcare benefits if they are receiving a monthly (lifetime) pension and if a retiree dies, the surviving spouse "will continue to receive
the retiree's benefits ... until death or remarriage. 4 s The concurrence

stated that such language was relevant to the inquiry on remand.4 9
C. THE REESE PER CURIAMREVERSAL

On February 20, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision, CNH IndustrialLLC v. Reese, summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit's post-Tackett decision in favor of a class of nearly four thousand
retirees and spouses. 50 Based on the certiorari petition alone, the Court
42. Id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
43. Id. (quoting 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 30:2 at 27 (2012)).
44. Id. at 443 (internal citation omitted).
45. -Id.
46. Id. (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 203 (1991)).
47. See id. at 443-44.
48. Id. at 444.
49. See id at 443.
50. See CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S.
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
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decided that retiree healthcare benefits did not survive expiration of the
51
CBA under which the class members retired. The Supreme Court saw
issue rethis "[s]horn of Yard-Man inferences," as a "straightforward"
52
merits.
the
on
argument
oral
or
quiring no briefing
Reese began its analysis by stating: "This Court has long held that
collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted 'according to ordinary principles of contract law,"' quoting only Tackett for that premise
throughout the decision. 53 In particular, Reese quoted Tackett's reference
to Story and Williston for "the principle of contract law that the written
is presumed to encompass the whole agreement of the paragreement
54
ties."
Reese adopted the reasoning of Judge Jeffrey Sutton's dissent in
Reese v. CNH IndustrialLLC.55 Reese quoted Judge Sutton's view that
the majority's analysis in Reese III was simply "Yard-Man re-born, re56
built, and re-purposed for new adventures." It adopted Judge Sutton's
assessment that a clause in the 1998 CBA, which stated that the insurance
agreement ran "concurrently" with the CBA and was "made a part of' the
57
CBA, was "all anyone needs to know to decide this case." It was this
to be so straightforward that no briefing on the
premise that Reese found
58
necessary.
was
merits
Reese also faulted the Reese Ill majority for its analysis of internal
contract clues of intent from other provisions in the insurance agreement. 59 Reese held that the majority erred in even considering what the
60
Group Benefits Plan (hereinafter "GBP") said about retiree healthcare or about other benefits - because the CBA's general duration clause,

51. Seeid.at766.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 763 (internal citation omitted).
54. Id. at 763. Neither Tackett nor Reese cited Steelworkers v. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co.,
which held the written CBA was not the "whole agreement" but rather that "the industrial common
law - the practices of the industry and the shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it." Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581-82 (1960) (emphasis added).
55. See Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877, 887-93 (6th Cir. 2017), rev'd 583 U.S._,
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018) (hereinafter Reese III).
56. Reese, 583 U.S._, 138 S. Ct. at 763.
57. See id. at 765; Reese IlL 854 F.3d at 888-89 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
58. See Reese III, 854 F.3d at 889 (Sutton, J., dissenting); Reese, 583 U.S. -138 S. Ct. at 766.
, 138 S. Ct. at 765-66.
59. Reese, 583 U.S.
60. The "group insurance plan" referenced in the 1998 CBA was actually the Group Benefit
Plans (GBP), a separate document that contained the provisions governing the collectively bargained
health care benefits, including retiree healthcare benefits. Before 1990, this document had been called
the "Group Insurance Plan." See Reese III, 854 F.3d at 877.
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incorporated in the GBP through the "concurrent" provision,.govemed. 6 1
Reese explained that Tackett rejected any such inferences from other parts
62
of the CBA "because they are not established rules of interpretation."
Quoting Tackett, Reese stated that "[t]he Yard-Man inferences 'distort the text of the agreement,' fail 'to apply general duration clauses,'
erroneously presume lifetime vesting from silence, and contradict how
"'Congress specifically defined' key terms in ERISA. ' '6 3 Because the
CBA was unambiguous, Reese held that extrinsic evidence of intent was
64
inadmissible.
Finally, again echoing Sutton's dissent, Reese faulted the Sixth Circuit's analysis because, the Court opined, no other Circuit would have
found vested benefits under the facts of Reese 111.65
III. THE STRAIGHTFORWARD ISSUE IN REESE- THE CBA's
"CONCURRENT" CLAUSE
A. All Anyone Needs to Know
The source of the straightforward issiie identified by Reese - what
Judge Sutton claimed was "all anyone needs to know to decide this case"
- was Section 4A of the 1998 CBA between CNH and the UAW. As stated
by Judge Sutton, Section 4A provides: "the Group Benefit Plan 'will run
concurrentlywith this Agreement and is hereby made a part of this Agreement.,,,66

Because the 1998 Group Benefit Plan contained the provisions conferring retiree health care benefits, Reese agreed with Judge Sutton that
those benefits were unambiguously limited to the term of the 1998 CBA
67
through the Section 4A concurrent provision.
B. A Clear Manifestation of Intent?
The Supreme Court purported to rely on the same plain'meaning rule
in Reese, as in Tackett.68 This rule provides that if the intent of the parties
61. Reese, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. at 766.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Reese III, 854 F.3d at 893 (Sutton, J., dissenting)).
66. Reese II, 854 F.3d at 888-89 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (citing 1998 CBA at 76, Reese v. CNH
Industrial N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 439-4) (emphasis added).
67. See Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. at 766.
68. Id.
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is unambiguously expressed in the contract, the court must enforce that
intent without further inquiry. 69 There is only an ambiguity, Reese states,
when there are "two competing interpretations, both of which are fairly
plausible." 70 Finding no such ambiguity, Reese summarily held that re71
tiree healthcare benefits were confined to the term of the CBA.
As discussed below, courts and commentators have cautioned that
the plain meaning rule is often employed to foreclose inquiry into actual
72
intent, rather than as a means of discovering it. So then, what is the plain
meaning of the concurrent clause.
The concurrent clause says nothing about retiree healthcare benefits.
It does not say that "all retiree healthcare benefits terminate at the expiration of the CBA." It does not say that "the employer will provide retiree
healthcare benefits for the term of this Agreement only." It does not say
that "retiree healthcare benefits will not vest during the term of the CBA."
Any of these statements would make the meaning plain, but the parties
said nothing of the kind. Even if the concurrent clause provided that "all
benefits provided for under the insurance agreement will terminate concurrently with the expiration of the CBA," the meaning would have been
plainer, although still far less than explicit as to whether retirement benefits accrued or vested during the CBA's term.
The concurrent clause only says that the GBP runs concurrently with
the CBA and is made a part of it - something anyone familiar with collective bargaining would expect. At CNH, as elsewhere, employee insurance
benefits were almost always negotiated at the same time as other collectively bargained subjects, during the economics sessions of labor negotiations. When all contract terms were agreed upon and summarized in a
tentative agreement, the membership ratified the new CBA as a complete
package of contractual agreements. The concurrent clause making the
GBP a part of the CBA says nothing about the duration of any particular
CBA provision or any specific benefit in the GBP.
In Litton FinancialPrintingDiv. v. NLRB, as the concurrence noted,
the Supreme Court stated that "constraints upon the employer after the
expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement . .. may arise ...
73
from the express or implied terms of the expired agreement itself." Later
in the opinion, Litton stated:

69. Id.
70. Id. at 765 (quoting Reese I1, 854 F.3d 877 (Sutton, J., dissenting)).
71. Id. at 766.
72. See infra Section W.A.
73. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 203 (1991).
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[C]ontractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course; ,upon termination of the bargaining agreement. Exceptions are determined by contract interpretation. Rights which accrued or vested under the agreement
will, as a general rule, survive termination of the agreement. And of
course, if a collective bargaining agreement provides in explicit terms
that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration, disputes
as to such continuing benefits may be found to arise under th6 agreement
74

If "accrued, or vested" contract rights can survive a CBA's termination clause based on implied contract terms, as Litton held, the duration
of a CBA obligation cannot be determined simply by the fact that there is
a termination clause in the CBA.
The concurrent clause, after all, only makes the insurance plan apart
of the CBA. If employer obligations can extend beyond the expiration of
the CBA if they vested or accrued during its term through either explicit
or implied terms, as Litton holds, provisions of an incorporated GBP can
survive the CBA's expiration as well - and can arise from the implied
terms of the GBP that ran concurrently with the CBA. Thus, the Supreme
Court took a leap from the meaning of the actual language of the concurrent clause to a presumption that it unambiguously limited retiree health
care. Such a presumption necessarily limits all negotiated benefits in the
CBA, as well as the GBP, to the term of the 1998 CBA - in a manner
inconsistent with Litton. Such a presumption forecloses analysis of the
actual meaning of specific contract provisions, contrary to those exceptions to the "general rule" stated in Litton. Certainly, the meaning of the
concurrent clause was not that plain, at least not in the sense necessary to
make the issue of the duration of retiree healthcare benefits that straightforward.

74. Id. at 207. Tackett cited Litton but, quoted only the first and last sentence of this paragraph,
leaving the definite, but erroneous impression that only the only exceptions to the general rule are
when the CBA explicitly provides that obligations survive the CBA's expiration date. Id. Reese also
cited Litton but only for the proposition that, in the ordinary course, obligations do not survive the
expiration of a CBA. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 U.S. at 763. In his dissent in Reese III, Judge Sutton
quoted only the first sentence from Litton. Reese III, 854 F.3d at 888 (Sutton, J., dissenting). Ironically, more than twenty years before Reese, the Sixth Circuit, in Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., rejected
the employer's attempt to limit the holding in Litton in the same manner. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1996). After quoting this paragraph from Litton, Golden stated: "[iln
making this argument, the defendant ignores the portion of the above quotation.., in which the Court
recognizes that courts, through rules of contract interpretation, can find that rights accrue or vest under
the agreement even if they are not explicitly set out in the agreement." Id. at 655 (concluding that
"[flar from contradicting Yard-Man, Litton actually supports its reasoning); see alsoBidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 606-08 (7th Cir. 1993).
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The obvious message of Reese is that the Supreme Court intended its
summary decision to reinforce and amplify its holding in Tackett - and in
the process substitute a presumption against vesting in all cases in place
of the Yard-Man inference that provided a "nudge in favor of vesting in
close cases." 75 But, there is far more to the story and it shows why the
Reese retirees deserved better than the shabby, summary treatment they
received from the Supreme Court.
IV. ORDINARY PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW
Tackett's admonition to apply ordinary principles of contract law to
collective bargaining agreements governed by Section 301 is contrary to
long-standing precedent that CBAs are not ordinary contracts and are not
governed by the same rules governing ordinary contracts 76 and that the
written CBA does not contain all of the terms governing the parties' collective bargaining relationship. 7 7 This admonition also violates the longestablished mandate that Section 301 requires a uniform federal common
under Section 301 that is not dependent on the laws of the
law developed
78
fifty states.
Although there is broad agreement over some basic principles of contract interpretation, each state has its own body of common law governing
the interpretation of contracts. For example, Tackett cites Corbin's 1960
treatise on Contracts. 79 But, Corbin on Contracts was revised thirty-eight
years later, in 1998, adding a new, separate volume on Interpretation of
Contracts. 8" This new volume expands upon Corbin's view that "[i[t is
75. Reese v. CNH America LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd 583 U.S._, 138 S.
Ct. 761 (2018) (hereinafter Reese 1) (emphasis added).
76. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 311 (1989); Transportation-Communication Emps. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 161 (1966); John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
77. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) ("Industrial
common law - the practices of the industry and the shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although not expressed in it.").
78. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988). In Lingle, the Court
held that: "[Section] 301 mandate[s] resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution
of labor-management disputes." Id. Lingle cited Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., where the Court
rejected the application of state law rules of contract interpretation to the issue of whether the CBA
implicitly prohibited a strike called by the union: "[Tlhe subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one
that calls for uniform law' . . . [t]he possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements." Id. n.3 (internal citations omitted).
79. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 441 (2015).
80.

See MARGARET KNIFF1N, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS §

24.7 at 30 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1998).
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therefore invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the
words of a contract ... that extrinsic evidence be admitted to make the
court aware of the 'surrounding circumstances.' 8 1 According to Professor Margaret Kniffm, the author of the 1998 volume, Corbin's approach,
calling for an examination of extrinsic evidence before any judicial determination of whether ambiguity exists, is inconsistent with the "plain
meaning rule." 82 She tracks the evolution, beginning in 1968, with the
Supreme Court of California, 83 and later followed by other states, where
courts have become increasingly receptive to Corbin's arguments for the
admission of extrinsic evidence to discern intent "without [first] inquiring
whether the contract terms are susceptible to the meaning that may be
84
shown."
By definition, there cannot be any uniform application of ordinary
principles of contract law if there is no universal agreement on what those
principles are. Tackett employed a strict application of the plain meaning
rule - without acknowledging the Court's departure from Corbin's approach. 85 Federal courts are now left with the task of applying the different jurisdictional and theoretical variations of ordinary principles of contract law to CBAs, rather than the objective, uniform interpretation
approach established in Lucas Flourand Lingle.8 6
This article is not about such abstract jurisprudential issues. Rather,
it is about how an actual application of ordinary principles of contract law
would have disclosed the actual intent of the parties in Reese, an intent
annulled by the Supreme Court's ceremonial application of those principles.
A.

The Plain Meaning Rule - Unambiguous ContractLanguage
Need Not be Interpretedin a Vacuum; the Underlying Goal in
Interpretinga Contractis to Ascertain the Intent of the Parties

In explicating the ordinary principles of contract interpretation,
Tackett began with the uncontested proposition that, when interpreting
contracts, including CBAs, "the parties' intentions control."8 7 Tackett
then quoted Williston for the proposition that: "Where the words of a contract in writing are clear and unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. §24.7at31.
Id. § 24.7 at 36.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 968).
KNIFFIN, supra note 80, at 30.
M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 441-42 (2015).
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435 (internal citation omitted).
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88
in accordance with its plainly expressed intent." Furthermore, the Court
cited Story for the proposition that "the written agreement is presumed to
89
encompass the whole agreement of the parties" and Corbin for the "trashould not construe ambiguous writings to
ditional principle that courts
90
promises."
lifetime
create
Even cursory examination of Tackett's analysis shows how thin and
selective it is. While the Court did not exclude the use of other ordinary
contract principles, its focus was on literalness within the confines of the
written document. 9 1 Reese's subsequent per curiam reversal, summarily
rejecting the Sixth Circuit's post-Tackett analysis in Reese I1,demonstrates that, going forward, an employer's obligations will survive the expiration of a CBA, if at all, only9 2in the most exceptional circumstances regardless of the parties' intent.
Williston is hardly as dogmatic as Tackett implied. Instead, immediately following the "clear and unambiguous" passage quoted by Tackett,
Williston elaborated on the correct interpretive principles:

While unambiguous contract language is generally interpreted without
resort to extrinsic evidence, it need not be interpreted in a vacuum; the
underlying goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the
88. Id. (internal citation omitted).
89. Id. at 440 (internal citation omitted).
90. Id.at 441.
91. See Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court's Application of "OrdinaryContract PrinciInterpretaples" to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare Benefits: Perpetuating the
Supreme
the
(questioning
(2017)
300
299,
L.
EMP.
&
LAB.
OF
J.
ABA
32
Quagmire,
tion/Gap-Filling
Court's contractual analysis in Tackett); see also Maria O'Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete
ContractsforPost-Employment Healthcare,36 PACE L. REV. 317, 330 (2016); Tex Pasley, Ordinary
Principlesof ContractInterpretationv. OrdinaryPrinciples of Contract Interpretation:The Future
of Retiree HealthcareBenefits After M&G Polymers v. Tackett, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 125, 126
(2017).
92. CNH Indus. N.V.v. Reese, 583 U.S._, 138 S.Ct. 761, 763 (2018). Tackett was remanded
from the Sixth Circuit to the district court to determine whether retiree healthcare benefits vested
under ordinary principles of contract law. In doing so, the court stated that it cannot be presumed that
"a general durational clause says everything about the intent to vest." Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA,
But, starting with Gallo v. Moen
LLC, 811 F.3d 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2016) (hereinafter Tackett 111).
Inc., it became apparent that a CBA's general durational clause had added significance. Gallo v.
Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265, 269-71 (6th Cir. 2016). For example, in Serafino v. City of Hamtramck,the
Sixth Circuit cited Gallo for the proposition that while a general duration clause may not say everything about the parties' intent to vest a benefit, "it certainly says a lot." Serafino v. City of
Hamtramck, 707 F. App'x 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2017); Cole v. Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695, 700-01 (6th
Cir. 2017); Watkins v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 875 F.3d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2017). Since Reese, the
Sixth Circuit has not found a single CBA where the parties intended for retiree healthcare benefits to
survive the CBA's expiration. See Cooper v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 884 F.3d 612, 623 (6th Cir. 2018);
Fletcher v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 892 F.3d 217, 228 (6th Cir. 2018); Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 763 F.
App'x 470, 473 (6th Cir. 2019).
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parties, and the surrounding circumstances when the parties entered the
contract, among other relevant considerations, may well shed light on
93
that intent.
In fact, Williston also stated:
Under the prevailing, more expansive view of what the court may consider, the court does not simply determine whether, from its perspective,
the contractual language is clear; rather, the court hears the proffer of
the parties and determines if there are objective indicia that, from the
parties' linguistic reference point, the contract's terms are susceptible of
different meanings. The court must consider the words of the agreement, including writings made a part of the contract by annexation or
incorporation by reference, the alternative meanings suggested by the
parties, and any extrinsic evidence offered in support of those meanings.
Extrinsic evidence properly considered... may include the structure of
the contract; the parties' relative positions and bargaining power; the
bargaining history; ... and any conduct of the parties which reflects
their understanding of the contract's meaning.
Only after a careful and painstaking search of all the factors shedding
light on the intent of the parties will the court conclude that the language
94
in any given case is clear and unambiguous.
Corbin also suggests that evidence of surrounding circumstances
should generally be admitted to enable a court to determine what the
"plain" meaning of the contract actually is. 9 5 According to Corbin:
Seldom should the court hold that the written words exclude evidence
of the custom, since even what are often called "plain" meanings are
shown to be incorrect when all the circumstances of the transaction are
known; and usages and customs are a part of those circumstances by
which the meaning of words is to be judged.96
In the 1998 Revised Edition of Corbin, Profess6r Kniffin doubts that
words ever have "only one true meaning." 97 She quotes Holmes: "It is not
true that in practice (and I know no reason why theory should disagree

93.
94.
95.

See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 30:6 at 108.
Id. § 30:5 at 82-86.
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIvE TREATISE ON

THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 532, § 542 at 100-03 (1960).

96. Id. § 555 at 239.
97. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.7 at 30.
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with the facts) a given word or even a given collocation of words has one
meaning and no other." 98 She then states:
It is therefore invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning
to the words of a contract and can select a single meaning rather than
other possible ones as the basis for the determination of rights and other
legal effects, that extrinsic evidence be admitted to make the court aware
of the "surrounding circumstance," including the persons, objects, and
events to which the words can be applied and which caused the words
to be used. 99
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also rejects strict application
100 According to the Restatement: "Words and
of the plain meaning rule.
'10 1 Apother conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances."
plication of the rules set forth in the Restatement "do not depend upon any
determination that there is an ambiguity, but are used in determining what
possible
meanings are
102reasonably possible as well as in choosing among
meanings.
Wigrnore also rejected rigid reliance on any judicially-supposed
03
plain meaning of contract words. 1 "The history of the law of [i]nterpretation is the history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious formalism
4
to a flexible rationalism."' 1 "The fallacy consists in assuming that there
105 "The truth had
is or ever can be someone real or absolute meaning."
finally to be recognized that words always need interpretation; that the
process of interpretation inherently and invariably means the ascertainment of the association between words and external objects; and that this
resort to extrinsic matters for applying and enforcmakes inevitable a free
10 6
document."'
ing the
These authorities reinforce the point that discovering and enforcing
the actual intent of the parties to a contract - not strict adherence to any
supposed literal meaning - is the "cardinal," overriding rule of contract
construction.I°7
98. Id. (internal citation omitted).
99. Id. § 24.7 at 31 (elaborating on her criticisms of the plain meaning rule).
1981).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 at 87 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST.
101. Id. at 86.
102. Id. at 87 cmt. a.
103.

9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE

INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2462 at 194 (3d ed. 1940).
104. Id. at 187.
105. Id.§2462at191.
106. Id. § 2470 at 227.
107. KNIFFIN, supranote 80, at 37.
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Although not at all apparent from either Tackett or Reese, a flexible
inquiry into the parties' actual intent, rather than a ceremonial plain meaning shortcut, has traditionally been the guiding principle of the Supreme
Court.'1 8 In Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Hill, the Court stated:
[W]e should look carefully to the substance of the original agreement
...
as contradistinguished from its mere form, in order that we may give
it a fair and just construction, and ascertain the substantial intent of the
parties, which is the fundamental rule in the construction of all agreements. 109
In Towne v. Eisner, Justice Holmes wrote: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time
in which it is used."'' 0
In Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
wrote: "It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to
resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."' 1 1
In Williams v. Fenix and Scission, Inc., then circuit judge Anthony
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, relied in part on Williston in rejecting
a strict plain meaning approach to contract interpretation:
This approach to contractual interpretation has been rejected by the circuit and it is out of line with better-reasoned contract law cases. It results
in the exclusion of evidence clearly probative of the parties' understanding of their obligations. Examination of the circumstances which give
rise to the agreement, and of subsequent acts and communications which
bear on the parties' intent at the time of contracting, are relevant to show
the intended meaning of a provision in a contract. 1 12

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Hillman, supra note 91, at 301.
Canal Co. v. Hill, 82 U.S. 94 (1872).
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
Williams v. Fenix and Scission, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy,
J.,

concurring). A decade earlier, in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co.,
Chief Justice Traynor rejected the plain meaning rule, stating that limiting "the determination
of the
meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be
clear
and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose
a
degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., v.
G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
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In addressing the meaning of CBAs, Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., stated: "Words in
the
a collective bargaining agreement, rightly viewed by the Court to be
words
like
charter instrument of a system of industrial self-government,
only by reference to the background
in a statute, are to be understood' 113
inclusion."
their
to
rise
which give
Justice Brennan's invocation of statutory interpretation is demonstrated through United States v. Witkovich, wherein the Supreme Court
rejected a literal approach to statutory construction stating: "[O]nce the
for giving a
tyranny of literalness is rejected, all relevant considerations
114 In United States v.
rational content to the words become operative."
American Trucking Ass'ns, the Court reiterated the rule that the literal
meaning of a statute should be disregarded if necessary to enforce Congressional intent. 11 5
Ironically, one of the basic principles of contract interpretation that
Yard-Man found "fully appropriate for discerning the parties' intent in
collective bargaining agreements" was this very principle - "[t]he inonly' be
116
tended meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course,
inclusion."
its
to
rise
gave
which
context
the
understood in light of
Taking a strict textual approach, Tackett gave Yard-Man no credit for applying this basic principle of contract law, one recognized by most author- as essential for discerning
ities - and the Supreme Court before 1Tackett
17
intent.
actual
the contracting parties'
While Tackett allowed consideration of other contract rules - which
it did not identify1 18 - Reese appears to have shut the door on any practical
limitations on strict application of the plain meaning rule, at least for
J., concurring).
113. Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan,
114. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957).
115. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1934).
116. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983).
the plain meaning
117. Id. Another ordinary principle of contract interpretation that modifies
ambiguity exists when
rule is the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities. Id. A latent
have a different meaning
contract language that appears to have a plain meaning on its face is shown to
Zuber v.
in the particular circumstances by either extrinsic evidence or collateral circumstances.
v. CounCo.
Ins.
Nautilus
law);
Pennsylvania
(construing
2017)
Cir.
(3d
258
255,
Boscov's, 871 F.3d
Texas law); Burlison v.
try Oaks Apartments Ltd., 566 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 2009) (construing
Rossetto v. Pabst BrewUnited States, 533 F.3d 419, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (construing Tennessee law);
bargained retiree
collectively
(addressing
ing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 542-44 (7th Cir. 2000)
in deteressential
often
is
but
proper
only
not
is
evidence
such
to
resort
cases,
healthcare). In such
after
mining the actual intent of the parties. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, at 1199. Unsurprisingly,
genthe
in
ambiguity
a
latent
was
there
that
argument
retirees'
the
rejected
Circuit
Tackett, the Sixth
2017).
Cir.
(6th
328
321,
F.3d
875
Inc.,
Int'l,
eral duration clause of the CBA. Watkins v. Honeywell
Cir. 2016) (Tackett III)
118. See Tackett v. M&G Polymers U.S., LLC, 811 F.3d 204, 208 (6th
of contract law.").
principles
ordinary
the
(The Supreme Court "did not purport to discuss all of
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collective bargaining agreements.'1 19 Instead, Tackett and Reese create a
presumption that a CBA's general duration clause controls not only the
duration of the particular CBA, but the duration of all benefits provided
therein. 120 An examination of the actual CBA language shows that Reese
short circuited the required analysis and abrogated the court's primary role
in contract cases - to determine and enforce the actual intent of the parties.
B. The Parties'Intent Must Be GatheredFrom the Whole
DocUment
A basic contract interpretation principle is that courts must look at
the contract as a whole, rather than at individual provisions in isolation.
In United States v. Utah, Nev. & Cal.Stage Co., the Supreme Court stated:
"The elementary canon of interpretation is not that particular words may
be isolatedly considered, but that the whole contract must be brought into
view and interpreted with reference to the nature of the obligations between the parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming
12 1
them."

More than a hundred years later, the First Circuit; in VFC Partners
26, LLC v. Candlerocks CentennialDrive LLC, reiterated that point, stating that the intent of contracting parties must be gathered from "the contract as a whole and not by a special emphasis on any one part. 12 2
In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court applied this
"elementary canon of interpretation" to the interpretation
of CBAs twenty-five years before Yard-Man.12 3 It stated:. "Like other contracts,
[CBAs] must be read as a whole and in the lightof the law relating to it
119. CNH Indus. N.V.v. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. 761 (2018). Williston now cites Tackett
for its application of the ordinary plain meaning rule; however, he also cites John Wiley & Sons and
Warrior& Gulf Navigation for the proposition that a CBA is not an ordinary contract. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); see also WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 55:3 at 20,
§ 55:15 at 62-63.
120. In the wake of Reese, the Sixth Circuit has adopted such a presumption. For example, in
Fletcher v. Honeywell International,Inc., the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court judgment for the
retirees. Fletcher v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 892 F.3d 217,223 (6th Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit stated
that it could "distill a clear rule" from post-Tackett decisions and from the Supreme Court's reversals
in Reese and Kelsey-Hayes that "a CBA's general durational clause applies to healthcare benefits
unless it contains clear, affirmative language indicating the contrary." Id.
121. United States v. Utah, Nev. & Cal. Stage Co., 199 U.S. 414, 423 (1905) (internal citations
omitted).
122. VFC Partners 26 v. Cadlerocks Centennial DTive, 735 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir, 2013) (constru,
ing Massachusetts law). See also, e.g., Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. Cal,, 813 F.3d
1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2015); Aeroground, Inc. v. CenterPoint Properties Trust, 738 F.3d 810, 813 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing Illinois law).
123. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956).
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when made." 12 4 According to Williston, "a contract will be read as a
whole and every part will be read with reference to the whole. If possible,
the contract will be so interpreted as to give effect to125its general purpose
entirety."
as revealed within its four comers or in its
1. The Other Concurrent Provision
Had Reese applied this ordinary contract principle, that a contract
must be read as an integrated whole rather than as a series of isolated provisions, Reese would not have had to delve deeply into the 1998 CBA to
discover that its entire analysis was based on a false premise. There is an
important fact within the contract itself, not disclosed in Reese or in Judge
Sutton's dissent in Reese I1, that readers unfamiliar with the history of
the Reese litigation would never know. But when known, this single undisclosed fact demonstrates that the notion that the issue was "straightforward" because the insurance concurrent clause was "all anyone needs to
know" is utter nonsense.
The "concurrent" provision cited by Reese and Judge Sutton in his
Reese III dissent, Section 4A of the 1998 CBA, states "[t]he group insurwith this
ance plan agreed to between the parties will run concurrently
126 Section 4
Agreement."
Agreement and is hereby made a part of this
127 The contract fact that neiwas entitled "Group Insurance and Pension."
ther Reese nor Judge Sutton disclosed is that Section 4C of the 1998 CBA
provided, in language identical to 4A, that "[t]he pension plan agreed to
with this Agreement and is
between the parties will run concurrently
12 8
agreement."
hereby made a part of this
It is possible to imagine, as a contractual matter, that pension benefits
might be limited to the terms of the 1998 CBA. But, it is absurd to think
that any court considering that issue would consider it a "straightforward"
issue or "all anyone needs to know" to terminate pension benefits. That
a universal concept that pension benefits are
is because it is seemingly
129
benefits.
"lifetime"

124. Id.
125. WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 32.5 at 692.
(E.D.
126. CNH's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. B (1998 CBA) at 76-77, No. 04-70592
Mich.), ECF No. 439-4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
129. See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 443 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurv. Kelring) (assuming that the retirees' pension benefits lasted for their lifetimes); see also Golden
1994).
Mich.
(E.D.
415
410,
Supp.
F.
845
sey-Hayes Co.,
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So, if the 1998 GBP provides that retirees and surviving spouses of
retirees "shall be eligible" for health care benefits if they are "receiving"
or are "eligible to receive" a lifetime pension - which it does and has since
the language was first negotiated in 197 1130 - why then would those same
retirees and surviving spouses not have those health care benefits as long
as their pension benefits last, that is, for their lifetime? In the light of these
few undisputed facts, is there not at least an ambiguity about the duration
of pension-tied retiree health care benefits? 13 1 Why did Supreme Court
summarily dismiss the retirees' claims rather than first allowing them an
opportunity to be heard on the merits of this issue? Did Reese believe that,
in sending a message to the Sixth Circuit that it had failed to faithfully
implement Tackett, the contractual healthcare rights of four thousand
CNH retirees and their spouses who were receiving pensions were simply
acceptable collateral damage? 132

130. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C (1998 GBP), at 65, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 0470592 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2010), ECF No. 273-57; see also Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 0470592, 2007 WL 2484989 *1 (E.D. Mich.) (indicating that the "language of the Group Benefits Plan
from 1971 through 1998 remained substantially unchanged.").
13 1. It was this textual connection of retiree healthcare benefits to pension benefits that Yolton
found sufficiently convincing to affirm a preliminary injunction. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline
Co., 435 F.3d 571, 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2006). In Reese I, this tying of retiree healthcare to pensions
was a key factor in the court's affirmance of summary judgment for retirees. Reese v. CNH America
LLC (Reese1), 574 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018) (affirming a
preliminary injunction based on the textual connection of retiree health care benefits to pension benefits).
132. In effect, the Supreme Court used Reese to act as the surrogate for the Sixth Circuit acting
en bane. There had been several Sixth Circuit decisions presuming to implement Tackett principles
before the Court summarily reversed Reese III. See, e.g., Watkins v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 875 F.3d
321, 328 (6th Cir. 2017); UAW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 854 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2017); Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 855 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 2017); Gallo v. Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2016);
Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 811 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (Tackett III). The normal procedure when there is an intra-circuit dispute is for the Circuitto decide the issue acting en banc. Reese
stepped into the void, noting the Sixth Circuit had denied rehearing en banc in UA W v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese (Reese II1), 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761, 765 n.2 (2018). Reese quoted
Judge Griffin's dissent to the denial that "[o]ur post-Tackett case law is a mess" and Judge Sutton's
concurrence in the denial because "there is a real possibility that we would not have nine votes for
any one [approach]." Id. After Reese, the Sixth Circuit's case law is no longer "a mess." Id. Regardless of Litton's actual holding, or ordinary principles of contract law or any particular evidence
of actual intent, retirees now lose whenever there is, and there always is, a general duration clause in
a CBA. Cooper v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 894 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2018); Fletcher v. Honeywell Int'l,
Inc., 892 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2018); Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 763 F. App'x 470 (6th Cir. 2019).
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A Concise History of the Litigation of the Dual
"Concurrent" Clauses

None of the three Reese appellate opinions mentioned either of the
13 3
parallel concurrent provisions of the 1998 CBA.
4A
In his dissent in Reese III, Judge Sutton referred only to Section
134 Judge
GBP.
or
plan
insurance
group
the
to
of the 1998 CBA relating
Sutton certainly knew better. So did the Supreme Court, or it would have
if it had read the district court decision it reversed - or if it had read the
retirees' appellate brief defending that decision.
The fact that there were two concurrent clauses in the 1998 CBA,
one for the insurance plan and one for the pension plan, was no litigation
secret. 135 Early in the Yolton litigation, CNH argued that the identical insurance "concurrent" provision in the 1990 CBA proved that retiree health
1 36 Because it was CNH's primary textual
care benefits had not vested.
defense to vesting, the Yolton plaintiffs focused on the "concurrent" provision in discovery. 137 In early depositions, the plaintiffs questioned
CNH management representatives about both of the CBA's two "concurrent" clauses. CNH had designated Paul Crist, its longtime Manager of
Labor Relations, as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness for a June 11, 2003 deposi8
tion taken by El Paso. 13 Under cross examination, Mr. Crist admitted
that, despite the pension concurrent clause, retirees nonetheless had pension benefits "until they die;" he admitted, too, that surviving spouses had
survivorpension benefits "until their death." 139 Mr. Crist further admit4C of the CBA "does not limit [the duration of] the pented that Section
140
sion benefit."
On appeal from the district court's preliminary injunction in favor of
the retirees, 14 1 CN- again asserted the group insurance concurrent
v. CNH
133. See Reese v. CNH America LLC (Reese 1), 574 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2009); Reese
I), 874 F.3d
(Reese
N.V.
Indus.
CN-H
v.
Reese
2012);
Cir.
681(6th
F.3d
694
I1),
(Reese
LLC
Am.,
877 (6th Cir. 2017).
134. See Reese 11, 874 F.3d at 887-893 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
135. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d. 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2006).
136. Id. at 580.
137. Id.
No. 02-75164
138. Deposition of Paul Crist at 12, 156, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co.,
that an
request
can
party
one
(stating
30(b)(6)
P.
Civ.
R.
(E.D. Mich.) ECF No. 61; see also FED.
opposing party designate a witness to testify about particular issues).
ERISA
139. Deposition of Paul Crist, supra note 138, at 223. Mr. Crist initially answered that
when he was then
does not allow termination of pension benefits with the expiration of the CBA, but
"No." Id. at 232.
asked, "Well, the pension plan doesn't allow it either, does it?" Mr. Crist answered
140. Id. at 237.
141. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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provision as its primary contract defense to healthcare vesting. 142 In response, the retirees argued that the parallel pension concurrent clause and
Mr. Crist's deposition testimony demonstrated conclusively that the insurance concurrent clause did not limit retiree healthcare benefits to the
14 3
term of the CBA.
In Yolton v. El Paso Tennessee PipelineCo.,144 the Sixth Circuit,
after quoting both Sections 4A and 4C, agreed with the retirees stating:
[Plaintiffs] argue that the agreements would not use the same language
in sections 4A and 4C if it had different meanings. This argument further
bolsters the interpretation noted above that the expiration of a CBA affects only future retirees in the context of benefits. Reviewing "eachprovision-in question as part of the integratedwhole," the use of similar
language in sections 4A and 4C provides substantial support for the
plaintiffs' position.' 4 5
In litigating Reese in the district court, CNH did not initially argue
that the insurance concurrent clause limited retiree healthcare benefits to
the term of the agreement. 146 In its summary judgment motion, CNH cited
the insurance provision (but not the parallel pension provision) in its factual recitation of the 1990, 1995 and 1998 CBAs. 14 7 But, CNH's summary
judgment motion was based primarily on: 1) a "letter of understanding"
relating to the cost of healthcare for retirees selecting an alternate health
care plan; and 2) summary plan descriptions (SPDs) that CNH had unilaterally prepared after the negotiations. 14 8 In its response to plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, CNH never alluded to the insurance concurrent
provision. 149
142. Final Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 45, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 041182 (6th Cir.), ECF No. 52.
143. Final Brief of Appellees at 39, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571 (6th Cir.
2006) (No. 04-1182), ECF No. 56.
144. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 571.
145. Id at 581 (quoting UAW v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cie. 1983)) (emphasis
added). "The district court in Golden, likewise rejected the defendant's argument regarding the durational clauses because the same language was used regarding pensions and health insurance benefits. The district court stated that '[g]iven the defendant's logic, because its pension plan was incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement, its obligation to provide pensions ended with the
expiration of the agreement."' Id. at 581 n.7 (quoting Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 845 F. Supp. 410,
415 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
146. Brief in Support of CNH America LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Reese v.
CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 125.
147. Id.at 3, 5.
148. Id. at 13, 17.
149. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Reese v.
CNH Indus. N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 163.
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In Reese. I, Judge Sutton relied on Yolton in holding that retiree
150 As he stated in Reese I, Yolton earlier
healthcare benefits had vested.
151
commitments.
construed "effectively identical" collectively bargained
While Judge Sutton did not specifically address Yolton's discussion of the
parallel concurrent clauses, he necessarily knew of Yolton's holding on
that issue.

15 2

In the lead up to Reese, the district court explicitly addressed the sig153 In its November 9, 2015
nificance of the parallel concurrent clauses.
post- Tackett decision re-affirming summary judgment for the retirees, the
district court wrote:
Whether the parties intended certain obligations to survive the agree-

ment's expiration is, again, determined by looking at the contract as a
whole. Notably, here, the 1998 Central Agreement states that the group
insurance plan and the pension plan "run concurrently with this Agreeproment .... ." Yet no one contends that the company's obligation to 154

the agreement.
vide pension benefits ceased upon the expiration of

On CNH's appeal of this decision, the retirees specifically addressed
15 5 and quoted Yolton's discussion that the duthe two concurrent clauses
156
ality of these clauses supported the retirees. This was the district court
decision and the appellate brief that Judge Sutton had before him when he
wrote his dissent, asserting that the insurance concurrent clause, in isola157 Furthermore,
tion, was "all anyone needs to know to decide this case."
this was the district court's final decision and the retirees' final merits
brief before the Supreme Court when it accepted Judge Sutton's misstatement of the operative "facts."
It bears repeating that both the Sixth Circuit in Yolton and the district
court in Reese determined the meaning of the concurrent clauses in the
CBA according to the "basic principles of contract interpretation" - view158 The
ing "each provision in question as part of the integrated whole."
150. Reese v. CNH America LLC (Reese 1), 574 F.3d 315, 237 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd 583 U.S.
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
151. Id. at 322.
152. Id. at 322-23.
153. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 143 F. Supp. 3d 609, 614-15 (E.D. Mich. 2015), affid 854 F.3d
877 (6th Cir. 2017), rev'd 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
154. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
155. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4 n.1, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 15-2382 (6th Cir.),
ECF No. 27.
156. Id. at 23 (quoting Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2006)).
157. See Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese II1), 854 F.3d 877, 889 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J.,
dissenting), rev'd 583 U.S. __ 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
158. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581; Reese, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
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question is how, more than a decade after Yolton, a discredited and repeatedly rejected argument - one CNH itself had initially abandoned in litigating Reese159 - was resurrected by Judge Sutton in his Reese II1dissent
and employed "isolatedly" by the Supreme Court in violation of an "elementary canon" of contract interpretation 160 - and as the sole basis to
summarily deprive thousands of retirees and spouses of benefits to which
they were undoubtedly entitled. 16 ' The only plausible answer is that the
Supreme Court did not care about what the CBA actually said; about ordinary principles of contract law; about the actual intent of the parties; or
about the end of retiree healthcare tied to lifetime pensions, earned by
each retiree through decades of labor.
The Supreme Court presented the issue as straightforward to make
the point that the Sixth Circuit failed to heed its directions in Tackett. This
is clear from the Court's adoption of Judge Sutton's baseless pronouncement that the majority's analysis in Reese I1 is "Yard-Man re-born, rebuilt, and re-purposed for new adventures"' 162 and from Reese's uncritical
adoption of Sutton's worthless conjecture that no other Circuit would have
found vested benefits under "facts" of Reese. 163 But, in using Reese for
this purpose, the Supreme Court adopted Sutton's misrepresentation of
essential contract facts while, at the same time, summarily foreclosing any
further opportunity for the retirees to present the facts that would muddy
up the Court's straightforward issue.
In making its point, the Supreme Court ran roughshod over ordinary
rules of contract interpretation it trumpeted in Tackett 16 4 _ and over the
Reese retirees' right to have their contractual rights enforced based on actual - as opposed to selected and isolated and distorted - contract facts.
As least in Tackett, the Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to
"apply ordinary rules of contract law in the first instance."' 165 It did so
because "[t]his Court is one of final review, not of first view." 166 The
Reese retirees were not so fortunate. In its rush to make a point in Reese,
159. See supra notes 141-49.
160. See supra notes 121-25.
161. CNH Indus. N.V.v. Reese, 583 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 761, 763 (2018).
162. Id.
163. Id. Worthless, because it assumes that every other Circuit would, as Judge Sutton did,
misrepresent basic contract facts, ignore other compelling evidence of intent and refuse to apply applicable principles of contact interpretation.
164. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015). Tackett failed to cite the canon
that contracts must be read as a whole, leaving that to the concurrence. Id.at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Cardinal principle ...[is that] intention of the parties, to be gathered from the whole instrument, must prevail.").
165. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 442.
166. Id.
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this Supreme Court of final review summarily reversed a judgment in the
retirees' favor without giving them an opportunity to present the facts necessary to refute the Court's rationale for its decision.
3. Other Durational Provisions in the Group Benefit Plans
In Reese, the Supreme Court found fault with the majority's use of
"several of the Yard-Man inferences" to find ambiguity, such as other durational provisions in the insurance agreement and the tying of healthcare
to pensioner status. 167 Whatever those unidentified provisions were,
Reese decided that these "inferences" could not withstand the force of
1 6 8 Because the "concurrent
what it called the "general durational clause."
clause" did not mean what the Supreme Court so cavalierly presumed, we
now explore those provisions for additional indicia of intent.
The 1998 GBP contained provisions addressing other kinds of "in16 9 For example, the 1998 and earsurance," not just health care benefits.
lier GBPs promised short term accident and sickness benefits, long term
benedisability benefits, supplemental income benefits, survivor income
170
fits and life insurance benefits, of limited and specific duration.
Short term accident and sickness benefits were provided for up to
fifty-two weeks. 17 1 If, at the end of that period, the employee was still
disabled and under age sixty, long term disability benefits were payable
for the period of the employee's seniority less one year or until age sixtyfive. 172 An employee on disability was also entitled to continued
Achealthcare benefits "for the period during which he receives Weekly
173
benefits."'
Disability
Long-Term
cident and Sickness benefits and
Survivor Income Benefits (hereinafter "SmB") were monthly payments to surviving spouses of employees who died while actively employed at CNH. 174 There were two parts to SIB benefits, transition beneto all spouses
fits and bridge benefits. 175 The transition benefit was paid
76
of deceased active employees for twenty-four months. 1
167. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 761, 765-66 (2018).
168. Id at 766.
169. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A (1998 GBP), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592
(E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 273-55.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 62.
174. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A, supra note 169, at 5.
175. Id. at4.
176. Id.
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Monthly bridge benefits were then provided if the spouse was at least
forty-five years old or-if the spouse's age and the deceased active employee's years of service total fifty-five or more. 177 An eligible surviving
spouse was entitled to bridge benefits until the earliest of the "date the
surviving spouse remarries or dies," the date the spouse reaches "age 62
and one month," or "any lower age at which full benefits become payable
78
under the Federal Social Security Act" - hence the "bridge.?"
As to life insurance, the 1998 GBP provides that disability retirees:
Shall have the amount of their Group Life Insurance continued in an
unreduced amount until attainment of Age 65. At Age 65, the Life Insurance shall be reduced by 25%; then reduced again by 25% of the
original active amount upon attainment of age
66. The resulting benefit
179
will [be] 50% of the original active amount.
The 1998 GBP also provided that,' if an employee died as the result
of a work-incurred accident or illness for Which worker's compensation
benefits are payable, the surviving spouse "will be entitled to continue
[healthcare] coverage at no cost. Such coverage shall cease on the surviving spouse's remarriage, attainment of age when such surviving spouse is
eligible for Medicare or upon death."' 180 Children of these deceased employees were entitled to "for as long as the children would have continued
if the spouse had not died or remarried."'1 8 1
4.

The 1998 GBPs Durational Provisions in the Context of the
Contract Read as a Whole

In the 1998 GBP, CNH made long term commitments to employees,
to their surviving spouses, and to dependent children under these provisions. Employees with twenty or more years of seniority at disability were
entitled to disability benefits and healthcare for an equivalent number of
years.' 82 If the employee had twenty years of service at the'time of death,
177. Id. at 5.,
178. Id.at 5-6.
179. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 65.
180. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A, supra note 169, at 5.
181. Id. Unmarried children were eligible to at least age 19 and to age 25 under certain conditions. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50B, at 40-41, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D.
Mich.), ECF No. 273-56. Mentally or physically disabled children are entitled to coverage without
age restrictions if they are unmarried, incapable of self-support upon reaching age 19 or 25 and
claimed as a dependent on federal tax returns. Id.at 42.
182. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A, supra note 169, at 15; Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex.
50C,supra note 130, at 62.
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a thirty-five-year old surviving spouse was eligible for bridge benefits until death, remarriage or age sixty-two - for more than a quarter of a century. 183 If an employee who died in a workplace accident had a spouse
the spouse could receive health care benefits
who was twenty years old,
184
years.
forty
for more than
It was in this contractual context that the 1998 GBP provided that
employees "retired on" or "eligible for" and surviving spouses "eligible
defined medfor" or "receiving" a company pension "shall be eligible for"
1 85
benefits.
hearing
and
vision
ical, prescription drug, dental,
The express durational provisions show at least three critical things.
First, the concurrent insurance clause, even in isolation, did not necessarily mean what the Supreme Court said it meant - that all benefits in the
1998 GBP expired with the 1998 CBA. Provisions that explicitly provide
that specific benefits last far beyond - sometimes decades beyond - the
term of the existing CBA cannot reasonably be interpreted as confined to
the limited term of that agreement.
Second, taken together with the fact that retiree healthcare benefits
have no similar durational limits, but are provided while a retiree or surviving spouse is eligible for or receiving a pension benefit - that admittedly lasts "until death" - these provisions at the very least fairly support
an interpretation that retiree healthcare benefits are lifetime benefits. It
goes without saying (or should go without saying) that the UAW would
not have sought (and CNH would not have agreed to provide) better benefits for employees who had worked only a few years for CNH than for
retirees who had186spent decades working to earn the benefits promised
upon retirement.
Third, CNH promised long term SIB benefits and healthcare coverage to certain surviving spouses and dependents of deceased employees,
that is, to persons who never worked for CNII and who never had or would
have any future connection with CNH or to the CBA under which they
obtained the right to those benefits. It is unlikely that CNH would have
agreed to CBAs providing persons who never worked for CNH with benwhile limiting benefits
efits lasting decades beyond the CBAs' expiration
87
1
CNH.
for
decades
for retirees who worked

183. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A, supra note 169, at 5-6.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 65.
186. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that it is anomalous to guarantee lifetime coverage to retirees with a "couple of years" of service but not to those with
"dozens of years of service").
187. Id. at 656-57.
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In a post-Tackett decision, Gallo v. Moen Inc., Judge Sutton reiterated the obvious, that CBAs, by their nature, have limited terms.1 88 He
stated that "everything [CBAs] say about the topic [of retiree healthcare]
was contained in a three-year agreement. ' 189 What Judge Sutton ignored,
of course, is that while all CBAs have limited terms, unlike private contracts CBAs are interim agreements governing long-standing relationships. 190 Each individual CBA represents a temporal segment of what is
intended to be a long-term employment arrangement overseen by the federal statutory requirement that the employer and union bargain in good
faith to reach a subsequent agreement. 19 1 In this context, employees only
earn retirement benefits by working through the terms of many such
CBAs. In order to obtain a 30-year and out pension (and accompanying
retiree healthcare) at CNH, for example, an employee had work through
at least ten three-year CBAs.
The sam6 is true of bridge survivor income benefits and long-term
disability benefits. These benefits are predicated, in whole or in part, on
how long the employee worked for CNH, not simply on whether the employee was employed at the moment of disability or death. 192 These benefits, like retiree healthcare, were compensation for long service - far in
excess of the term of any single CBA - by rewarding loyalty, seniority
and employment longevity with correspondingly long-lasting fringe ben93
efits. 1
But, even for holdouts who still think that CNH's explicit promises
of benefits lasting decades were nonetheless confined to the term of a
CBA, the issue of the duration of retiree healthcare should no longer be
"straightforward."' 94 An impartial observer would need to know more,
rather than less, to reach a conclusion on the parties' intent - if that were
19 5
actually the goal of the inquiry.

188. Gallo v. Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir. 2016).
189. Id. at 269.
190. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-81 (1960) (addressing
the differences between a "mature" CBA and other contractual relationships in the context of union
grievance of a management practice going back nineteen years).
191. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991).
192. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50A, supra note 169, at 5.
193. Id. at 5-6, 15.
194. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018).
195. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 9, at 456 (stating that the application of rules of contract
interpretation "is often more ceremonial (as being decorative rationalizations of decisions already
reached on other grounds) than persuasive").
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C. A ContractMust Be Construedin The Context In Which It Was
Negotiated
While contractual provisions must be interpreted as part of an entire,
integrated agreement, another "ordinary principle" of contract law is that
the contract was negotiated is also relevant to a
the "context" in which 196
intent.
of
determination
As noted above, Williston stated that because "the underlying goal
in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties, ... the
the parties entered the contract... may
surrounding circumstances when
19 7
intent.
that
on
light
well shed
Corbin also recognizes that "what are often called 'plain' meanings
are shown to be incorrect when all the circumstances of the transaction
are known *... ,198
The Tackett concurrence seemed to consider this kind of evidence to
1 9 9 But, that is
be extrinsic, admissible only if there is a textual ambiguity.
inconsistent with the idea expressed by Williston and Corbin that the plain
meaning of contract language can sometimes only be determined by viewing that language in the context of the circumstances in which it was negotiated. 20 0 According to Williston and Corbin, the circumstances surrounding the contract negotiations are an integral part of the contract and
20 1
admissible to discern intent - rather than an extrinsic event.
D. Courts Must Give Effect to the Mutual Intent of the PartiesAt
the Time of Contracting
The relevant mutual "intent" is the intent that existed at the time
the parties agreed upon the language in dispute, construed in the context
that then existed. According to Williston: "the underlying goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties, and the

196. See supra Section W.A.
197. WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 30:6 at 108.
198. CORBIN, supra note 95, § 555 at 239; see also KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.7 at 31
("[E]xtrinsic evidence [must] be admitted to make the court aware of the 'surrounding circumstances'
...to which the words can be applied and which caused the words to be used.").
199. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427,443 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 453 (stating that extrinsic evidence includes "all writings,
oral statements, and other conduct by which the parties manifested their assent, together with any
prior negotiations between them and any applicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage").
200. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, at 31; WILLISTON, supranote 25, at 108.
201. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, at 31; WILLISTON, supranote 25, at 108.
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surrounding circumstances when the partiesentered the contract, among
20 2
other relevant considerations, may well shed light on that intent.
Williston states that the "basic rule of universal acceptance" is "for
the court, so far as possible, to put itself in the place of the parties when
their minds met upon the terms of the agreement, and, taking into consideration the writing itself, its purpose, and the circumstances leading up to
and attending its execution .... ,203 According to Williston, the court in
doing so, "will look forward from the date when the parties entered into
'
the bargain, not backward from some vantage point of a future day. "204
In Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Hill, the Court stated that, in
seeking to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties, courts "should look
carefully to the substance of the original agreement.., as contradistin... 205
guished from its mere form.
In U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
stated that "the fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect
to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting."2 06
CBAs are evolutionary agreements; they are not re-negotiated from
scratch every three years, but rather are modified, if at all, incrementally
over time. 207 As to the 1998 CBA, there are different vantage points from
which to determine the original intent. The most important is the intent of
the parties when they first negotiated the retiree healthcare provisions in
1971. Other possible vantage points disclosing parties' intent are those
contract negotiations when the initial promise of benefits was addressed
and discussed. In Reese, there were at least two later negotiations, one in
1990 and one in 1998, where analysis of the underlying circumstances
sheds light on the parties' actual intent regarding retiree healthcare.

202. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, at 31; WILLISTON, supranote 25, at 108.
203. WILLISTON, supra note 25, at 541 (quoting Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955)).
204. Id. at 541-42; KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.7 at 37 ("There is universal agreement that the
first duty of the court is to put itself in the position of the parties at the time the contract was made.").
205. Canal Co. v. Hill, 82 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1872) (emphasis added).
206. U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
207. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 219-21 (1979) (describing evolution of arbitration/no strike provision in sequential CBAs). In UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., the
court stated "[w]hen interpreting a collective bargaining agreement this court assumes that terms from
previous collective bargaining agreements continue unchanged unless specifically renegotiated."
UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 1999).
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1. The 1971 Negotiations Creating Retiree Healthcare
Benefits
The operative language of the GBPs relating to retiree health care
benefits - the language tying eligibility for retiree healthcare to eligibility
negotiations. 20 8
or receipt of a pension - was first agreed upon in the 1971
Clement Divine, as Case's Director of Benefits & Practices, represented
2 0 9 Shortly after the
Case on its Benefit Committee in those negotiations.
1971 negotiations ended, Mr. Divine wrote to the company's hourly retir2 10 Mr. Divine
ees telling them what Case agreed to in those negotiations.
stated that he composed the letter in a question and answer format to make
it easier for retirees to understand.2 1 1
Mr. Divine told retirees that Case agreed to provide retirees and their
surviving spouses with fully paid healthcare coverage beginning at age
65.212 The last of his questions was what would happen when a retiree
would
died.2 13 Mr. Divine's answer was that a retiree's surviving spouse214
lifetime."
have these healthcare benefits "for the remainder of her
Mr. Devine's letter was not a casual or uninformed communica2 16 He participated in
2
tion. 15 Mr. Devine was Case's Directorof Benefits.
Case.2 17
the 1971 negotiations - on the Benefits Committee representing
At a meeting between Case and the UAW, a little more than month after
the letter was sent, the UAW pointed out to Case management that Mr.
Divine's description of the duration of dependent child benefits in the letter was inaccurate. 2 18 Case agreed. Mr. Divine then sent a follow up letter
to the retirees making the correction - assuring retirees that their

208. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, 2007 WL 2484989 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,
2007), ECF No. 214.
209. See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 44, Reese v. CNH Global
N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 129-36 at 2.
210. Deposition of Judy Lojeski, Ex. 8, Reese v.CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.),
ECF No. 129-14 at 90.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at4.
214. Id.
215. Case understood its import. Mr. Divine informed retirees that, "[b]ecause this letter contains
considerable important information, please read it carefully and keep it for future reference." Id. at
1. Thirty-five years later, Virginia Clark, the surviving spouse of Merlin Clark, provided her copy of
Mr. Devine's letter, in its original envelope, to Class Counsel. This is the copy of the letter that Judy
Lojeski, who typed it for Mr. Devine, identified in her deposition. Id.at 29-30.
216. Id. at4.
217. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra note 209, Ex. 44 at 2.
218. Deposition of Judy Lojeski, supra note 210, Ex. 10.
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dependent children were covered up to age twenty-five under certain circumstances and that disabled children were covered "beyond age 25.-219
From this, we know what Case (later, CNH) intended when it agreed
in the 1971 CBA that "Surviving Spouses Receiving Company Pension
...shall be eligible" for healthcare benefits. We know that; at the instant
when Case first undertook the obligation to provide retiree healthcare benefits, Case understood that its obligation lasted beyond the term of any
CBA, and that, for a surviving spouse, healthcare lasted a "lifetime." We
also know that the UAW carefully reviewed Case's representations to retirees and had Case correct a "durational" error in its letter to retirees. We
know that both Case and the UAW had the same understanding of the
lifetime duration of Case's obligation - from the very beginning. This was
the record evidence of the context in which Case's commitment was made
- and at the time it was made. The Supreme Court never considered this
written, unequivocal admission because it determined that the "plain
meaning" of the concurrent clause in the 1998 CBA precluded consideration of any other evidence of the parties' intent.
2.

The 1990 CBA Negotiations Relating to Reba Williams

During the 1990 negotiations, Mr. Divine was still Case's chief benefits representative. 220 Jack Reese, who later became the lead plaintiff,
was the International Representative in the UAW's Ag-Imp Department
assigned to the 1990 Case negotiations. 2 2 1 In those negotiations, Case and
the UAW agreed to extend healthcare benefits to Reba Williams, the surviving spouse of a disability retiree who, because of a quirk relating to
Mr. Williams pension eligibility, did not live long enough for Ms. Williams to qualify for a spousal pension.2 2 2 Therefore, because Ms. Williams
was not "eligible for" or "receiving" a spousal pension, she did not qualify
for healthcare benefits under the terms of the GBP under which her husband retired.2 2 3
219. Id. Ex. 9 at 2.
220. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra note 209, Ex. 44, ECF No.
126-36 at 20.
221. Declaration of Jack Reese, at 2, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.),
ECF No. 273-2.
222. Ms. Williams would have been qualified for a spousal option pension if Mr. Williams had
lived to age 55. Because Mr. Williams died at age 53, Ms. Williams did not receive a pension. See
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability at fn. 14, Ex. 62, Reese
v. CNH America LLC, No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 129, 154 (filed under seal).
223. The Group Insurance Plans during the 1980's had the same requirements as the 1998 GBP
- a surviving spouse had to be "receiving" or "eligible to receive" a spousal pension to "be eligible
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After the 1990 CBA was finalized, Mr. Devine wrote to Ms. Williams on June 18, 1990 informing her that now, at "the recent labor contract negotiations," Case agreed to extend to her "coverages [that] are the
same as those provided to other surviving spouses of deceased retirees,
...including group medical insurance, prescription drug coverage,224group
Mr.
dental coverage, and vision and hearing care expense insurance."
[her]
for
Divine wrote that Ms. Williams "will now have these coverages
226
lifetime. 2 2 5 Mr. Divine copied Mr. Reese, the UAW's representative.
From this, we know that both Case and the UAW had the same understanding of the lifetime duration of Case's obligation for two decades.
The Reese III majority specifically noted Mr. Divine's letter2 27as extrinsic evidence supporting a finding that the benefits had vested. But,
the court did not indicate the context in which that statement was made in
the 1990 negotiations - or that CNH's benefits director made it - or that
it was copied to the UAW's International Representative in the negotiations. Reese III also did not mention that the letter was written by the same
CNH representative who, twenty years earlier, after the 1971 negotiations,
had informed retirees that their spouses were entitled to lifetime
healthcare benefits after their death.
Reese III did not mention that this letter, like Mr. Divine's 1971 letter, was a party admission on the ultimate issue - CNH's actual intent.
Under ordinary rules of contract interpretation, where the context in which
contracts are negotiated is critical, it is impossible to diminish the import
of this evidence of a lifetime obligation, unless, as in Reese, application
of those ordinary contract principles is purely ceremonial.

as to Liafor" the retiree medical insurance benefits. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 40.
129-29,
No.
ECF
Mich.),
(E.D.
04-70592
No.
bility, Ex. 37 at 39, Reese v. CNH Global N.V.,
Letter 224. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 61 (June 18, 1990
(E.D. Mich.),
Clement Devine to Reba Williams) at 2, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592
ECF No. 153.
225. Id.
226. Id.
rev'd 583 U.S.
227. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese II1), 854 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2017),
,138

S. Ct. 761 (2018).
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3.

The FAS 106 Letter
a. The Negotiation of the FAS 106 Letter m'1993

An issue that complicated the Yolton/lReese litigation from the beginning - from late 2002 when the Yolton retirees filed their lawsuit - was
228
the FAS 106 Letter.
The Financial Standards Accounting Board issued its new Standard
106 in December 1990.229 Before FAS 106, companies generally expensed annual expenditures for retiree healthcare as they did other routine
expenses - on a "pay as you go" basis.2 30 FAS 106 changed that by requiring companies to report their retiree healthcare obligations as "lifetime" obligations on an "accrual" basis.2 3 1 Companies could add this new
"debt" to their balance sheet immediately or amortize it on a delayed
basis
over the plan participant's future service periods - up to twenty years.2 32
The implementation of FAS 106 was a very big deal.2 3 3 Companies
generally had to add huge chunks of debt to their balance sheets.2 3 4 The
resulting reduction in net worth affected companies' ability to obtain financing and subjected them to higher financing costs. 235 Mergers and acquisitions became more difficult and complex to negotiate and imple236
ment.
228. See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462-63, 470-71, 473 (E.D.
Mich. 2003).
229. Summary of Statement No. 106, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (Dec. 1990),
https://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. Cf Musa A1-Darayseh, The $1,000,000,000,000 dilemma: accountingfor postretirement benefits under FASB statement # 106, NAT'L PUB. ACCT. (Nov. 1, 1992).
233. See generally Gregory J. Ossi, It Doesn 't
Add Up: the Broken Promisesof Lifetime Health
Benefits, Medicare, andAccounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not EqualSatisfactory Medical Coveragefor
Retirees, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233 (1997) (explaining changes companies will not
have to make as a result); see also Al-Darayseh, supra note 232.
234. Wise v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 932 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that FAS
106 "dramatically erodes estimates of net worth and pre-tax earnings ....
");see, e.g., Ossi, supra
note 233, at 238; see also Doron P. Levin, COMPANY REPORTS; G.M Lost $23.5 Billion Last Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/12ibusiness/company-reports-.gm
lost-23.5-billion-last-year.html.
235. See generally Matthew Cadrin, How to Improve Net Worth by DecreasingLiabilities,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/1212/how-to-improve-net-worth-bydecreasing-liabilities.aspx (last updated Dec. 13, 2012) (explaining ways to decrease liabilities).
236. See generally Elvis Picardo, How Mergers and Acquisitions can Affect a Company,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102914/how-mergers-and-acquisitions-can-affect-company.asp (last updated June 25, 2019) (listing reasons why mergers and acquisitions fail).
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There were only so many ways to address the impact of FAS 106
through accounting practices. 2 3 7 The actuarial assumptions that went into
valuing lifetime retiree obligations were basically the rate of medical in23 8 Accountants could
flation, the discount rate and participant mortality.
tinker with these assumptions - they could assume a lower medical inflation rate or a higher discount rate or increase the mortality rate - but only
239 The result was that employto a certain, objectively-justifiable extent.
ers began to unilaterally cut retiree healthcare benefits to reduce their reto litigation by retirees to enforce their rights to
portable debt, leading
2 40
healthcare.
lifetime
During the term of the 1990 CBA, Case came to the UAW seeking
24 1
relief from its FAS 106 reporting liability. The result of those negotiations was included in the 1993 Extension Agreement, which extended the
1990 CBA through February 5, 1995 and contained Section 9, entitled
"FAS 106 Out-Year Cost Limiters," referring to an attached Letter of
Agreement. 24 2 The 1993 FAS 106 Letter provided that Case would pay
more
the full cost of retiree health care benefits through April 1, 1998,
243 After
CBA.
1990
extended
the
of
than three years beyond the term
April 1, 1998, Case's obligation would be capped at a per person dollar
individuals and a greater
maximum, one amount for Medicare-eligible
244
Medicare-eligible.
not
persons
for
amount
In 1994, Tenneco, which owned 100 percent of Case stock, offered
24 5
(hereinafter "IPO").
that stock for sale through an initial public offering
Under a Reorganization Agreement preceding the IPO, Tenneco agreed
246 Case was reto assume the healthcare liability for pre-IPO retirees.
sponsible for healthcare benefits for each employee who retired after the
IPO. 24 7 July 1, 1994, the effective date the Agreement, became the date

237. See AI-Darayseh, supra note 232.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Wise v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 932-33 nn.3-4 (5th Cir. 1993).
241. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition at 13, Ex. 2, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co.,
No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 300, 300-4 (explaining that in May 1992, CNH provided Elliott
"Andy" Anderson, the UAW International Representative, with a power point entitled "Accounting
for Postretirement Benefits (FASB Statement No. 106)" prepared by Hewitt Associates).
242. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
243. Deposition of Tim Haas, Ex. 14 (Extension Agreement), at Attachment B, Reese v. CNH
Indus. N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 129-11 at 146.
244. Id.
245. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 2006).
246. Id. at 575-76.
247. Id. at 576.
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by which the Yolton and Reese classes were defined: Yolton covered preIPO retirees and spouses; Reese covered post-IPO retirees and spouses.24 8
Case and the UAW negotiated a new CBA in 1995, with a term
through March 29, 1998.249 In those negotiations, the UAW and Case
agreed to continue the FAS 106 Letter. 2 50 The dollar caps in the 1995 FAS
106 Letter remained the same, but the date the "cap" could be imposed
was extended to January 1, 1999, a date intentionally set beyond the term
of the 1995 CBA. 2 5 1
b., The Elimination of the FAS 106 Letter in 1998
In late 1997, Tenneco, which through a merger had become El Paso
Tennessee Pipeline Co., notified the Yolton retirees that it intended to enforce the 1993 FAS 106 Letter beginning on April 1, 1998, the date the
caps" in the 1993 Letter became effective.25 2 After that date, El Paso
wrote that pre-IPO (Yolton) retirees would have to pay a specified
monthly amount to retain their healthcare.2 5 3
Expressing shock and outrage, the UAW responded that the FAS 106
letter was only intended to give Case accounting relief as to its FAS 106
liability, not to limit its actual obligation to retirees. 2 54 In the 1998 CBA
negotiations, stung by El Paso's decision to charge pre-IPO (Yolton) retirees for their healthcare coverage, the UAW demanded that Case agree
to eliminate the FAS 106 Letter entirely.2 5 5 Case's initial bargaining response was to demand the letter be retained.2 5 6 It later proposed to suspend the effective date of caps to July 1, 2004, beyond the projected expiration date of the CBA.25 7 But, as the negotiations neared conclusion,
248. Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 11, Yolton v. El
Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2004), ECF No. 145; Reese v.
CNH
America, LLC, 227 F.R.D. 483,490 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
249. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement as to Liability, Ex. 41 (1990, 1995 and 1998
Central Agreement Signature Pages), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.),
ECF
No. 129-33 at 10.
250. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, 2007 WL 2484989, *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,
2007), ECF No. 214.
251. Id.
252. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164, 2008 WL 2566861 at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 7, 2008), ECF No. 380.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 21-22.
255. Declaration of Jack Reese, supra note 221, at 7
38, 39.
256. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 18 (Company Benefit Counter Proposals), Reese v. CNH
Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 273-23, at 3.
257. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 20 (Group Insurance Items), Reese v. CNIH Global N.V.,
No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 273-25, at 6, 17.
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2 58 As an integral part of
Case finally.acquiesced in the UAW's demand.
the 1998 negotiations, as stated in the Tentative Agreement signed by the
parties and as ratified by the union membership, the FAS 106 Letter was
eliminated.2 5 9
The significance of this is (and should have been) unmistakable. By
agreeing to eliminate the FAS 106 Letter in the 1998 negotiations, Case
agreed that there was no longer any limit (dollar cap) on its post-CBA
obligation to provide retiree health care benefits. Case could no longer
claim, as had El Paso, that its post-CBA obligation for retiree health care
was capped at the dollar levels included in the 1993 Letter. In other words,
by agreeing to eliminate the FAS-106 Letter, Case agreed that its postCBA obligation for retiree healthcare benefits was not only indefinite, but
also indefinitely unlimited.
During the Reese litigation, the retirees repeatedly pointed out that
the elimination of the FAS 106 Letter provided incontrovertible proof that
Case, by express agreement, had acknowledged its unlimited, post-CBA
obligation for retiree healthcare benefits - an acknowledgment that required judgmentfor the retirees. In those pleadings, plaintiffs stressed that
the entire point of the elimination of the FAS 106 Letter was so that Case
could never do what El Paso had done in using the FAS 106 Letter to
26 °
justify any limitation in its post-CBA obligation to retirees.
When the district court, post-Tackett, initially entered summary judg261
arguing just that fact.
ment for CNH, the retirees moved to reconsider,
The district court reconsidered and re-instated judgment for the retirees,
holding that, even under Tackett, the CBA was at least ambiguous, citing
Cap Letters and other evidence in support of the retirees'
the FAS 26106
2
position.
appeal brief,263
In Reese III, despite its prominence in the retirees'
the majority never mentioned the negotiated elimination of the FAS 106
Letter. And of course, the Supreme Court did not mention it. The failure
258. See Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 46 (Case Corporation/UAW Tentative Agreement),
Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 273-5 1, at 10, 25.
259. See id; see also Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, 2007 WL 2484989, *2 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 29, 2007), ECF No. 214.
260. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra note 222,
at 12-14; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to CNI America LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment
at 9-10, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 190; Brief in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at 13-19, Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D.
Mich.), ECF No. 447.
261. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 260, at 13-19.
262. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 143 F. Supp. 3d 609, 614-15 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff'd 854 F.3d
877 (6th Cir. 2017), rev'd 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
263. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supranote 155, at 9, 29, 38-39.
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to acknowledge this undisputed contract fact was, an abrogation of the
courts' fundamental duty - to determine the actual intent of the contracting parties.
E. The Parties'Practical
Constructionof a ContractIs Entitled to
Great,If Not ControllingInfluence
1. "No Surer Way to Find Out What the Parties Mean"
Another long-established rule of contract interpretation ignored in
the Tackett/Reese ceremonial, textual approach to contract interpretation
is that the parties' words and deeds are relevant, compelling, and determinative evidence of what the contracting parties'intended. In Brooklyn Life
Ins. Co. v. Dutcher,for example, the Court stated that "[t]here is no surer
way to find out what the parties meant, than to see what they have
64
done."2

In Lowrey v. Hawaii, the Court cited the value of evidence of the
parties' conduct in determining the intent of the parties in various circumstances
to ascertain the identity of the subject; in others its extent. In some, to
ascertain the meaning of a term, where it had acquired by use a particular
meaning; in others, to ascertain in what sense it was used, where it admitted of several meanings. But in all the purpose was the same. To
ascertain by this medium of proof the intention of the parties, where,
without the aid of such evidence, that could not be done, so as to give a
just interpretation to the contract. 26 5
The Court in Lowery quoted Dutcher Stating "[t]here is no surer way
to find out what the parties mean, than to see what they have done." 2 66
This "obvious and potent" principle, according to the Court, "hardly needs
267
the repetition it has received.,
264. Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1887).
265. Lowrey v. Hawaii, 206 U.S. 206, 221 (1907) (quoting Bradley v. Wash., Alexandria &
Georgetown Steam Packet Co., 38 U.S. 89,-99 (1839)).
266. Id. (quoting Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1887)).
267. Id. ("And equally obvious and potent is a resort to the circumstances and conditions which
preceded a contract. Necessarily in such circumstances and conditions will be found the inducement
to the contract and a test of its purpose. The conventions of parties may change such circumstances
and conditions, or continue them, but it cannot be separated from them. And this makes the value of
contemporaneous construction. It is valuable to explain a statute where disinterested judgment is alone
invoked and exercised. It is of greater value to explain a contract where self-interest is quick to discern
the extent of rights or obligations, and never yield more than the written or spoken word requires.").
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In Old Colony Trust Co v. City of Omaha, the Court held that "[t]he
practical interpretation of a contract by the parties to it for any considerable period of time before it comes to be the subject of controversy is
2 68 As recently as 2010, in
deemed of great, if not controlling, influence."
Alabama v. North Carolina,the Supreme Court reiterated that the practithe agreement, is "highly
cal construction, or the parties' conduct under
26 9
intent.
parties'
the
of
evidence
significant"
Williston states this rule as follows:
Given that the purpose of judicial interpretation is to ascertain the parties' intentions, the parties' own practical interpretation of the contract
- how they actually acted, thereby giving meaning to their contract during the course of performing it - can be an important aid to the court.
2 70
Thus, courts give great weight to the parties' practical interpretation.
In the 1998 revision of Corbin, Professor Kniffm states:
In the process of interpreting a contract, the court can receive great assistance from the interpreting statements made by the parties themselves
or from their conduct in rendering or in receiving performance under it.
The practical interpretation of a contract may thus be evidenced by the
parties' acts or by their words.2 7 1
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[w]ords and
other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if
the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great
weight., 272 Additionally, "any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of
the agreement." 2 73 Finally, "[t]he parties to an agreement know best what
and their action under it is often the strongest evidence of its
they meant,
' 2 74
meaning.
268. Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118 (1913).
269. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 346 (2010).
270. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 32.14 at 805-06. Williston noted that "many and perhaps
most courts" require an ambiguity before considering this evidence, although it is sometimes difficult
to determine when that is so even within a given jurisdiction. Id. Both Williston and Corbin note that
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement Second do not require an ambiguity before considering evidence of a party's conduct. Id.; KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.7 at 34-35.
271. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.16 at 135; see also CORBIN, supra note 95, § 558 at 252-53
(stating that the fact that parties employed "uncertain" language does not invalidate contract, "but it
causes much greater dependence to be put upon their subsequent practical interpretation and construction.").
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
273. Id. § 202(4).
274. Id. cmt g.
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According to the Uniform Commercial Code: "The,parties themselves know best what they have meant by their words of agreement and
their action under that agreement is the best indication of what that mean275
ing was."
This ordinary rule of contract construction has been uniformly ap-.
plied by circuit courts of appeal.2 76 The Second Circuit was understandably reluctant to credit the employer's asserted plain meaning of a contract
provision at trial when that meaning was at odds with the employer's previous interpretation of that language. 277 And, looking beyond any asserted
plain meaning of language is particularly applicable in the setting of collective bargaining, where the parties are entitled to rely on settled mutual
understanding of intent relating to long-standing obligations. 2 78 This is
true even when it appears that the settled, mutual interpretation of the employer's obligation conflicts with "some unambiguous contract provi2 79
sion."
2. "Entitled to full," "unchanged," "medical coverage" "for
your lifetime," "for life," "for as long as you are living."
CNH's understanding that it committed to provide retirees with lifetime health care benefits was repeatedly communicated by CNH to the

275. U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt 1 (AM. LAW INST.).
276. Croce v. Kurnit, 737 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1984); Natco Corp. v. United States, 240 F.2d
398, 402-03 (3d Cir. 1956) ("construction against interest by a party to a contract is strong evidence
of its meaning"); Pac. Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 554 (9th
Cir. 1949) (stating that the conduct of the parties after the execution of contract and before controversy
arose may indicate the actual construction which the parties have placed on the contract); Begnaud v.
White, 170 F.2d 323, 325-26 (6th Cir. 1948) ("recognized rule[] for construing a written contract,
which has been partially performed, is to ascertain how the parties have themselves construed it by
their partial performance of it.").
277. Patton v. Dole, 806 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding a breach of a statutorily prescribed
contract provision).
278. See Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, 989 F.2d 137, 132,
137 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that a course of dealing is particularly compelling over long period of
time); Int'l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, Local 47 v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 880 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir. 1989);
Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing Pekar v. Local 181, 311
F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1962)); Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975)
("fundamental rule of contract interpretation that great weight should be given the interpretation of
the contract to the parties thereto") (citing Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143, 150-51 (6th
Cir. 1962)).
279. Cronin, 588 F.2d at619 (citing Sandersonv. FordMotorCo., 483 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1973)).
In Sanderson, the Fifth Circuit held that both oral agreements and written policies accepted by both
parties to a CBA can modify or supplement the CBA's written provisions. Sanderson, 483 F.2d at
111.
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UAW. 28 0 This understanding was also communicated to employees as
well, to induce them to retire when CNH offered early retirement programs; when the company explained plant shutdown options; during exit
interviews with retirees; and in communications with surviving spouses
when a retiree died. 28 1 It was this common understanding lasting decades
that had long-since settled the issue of CNH's lifetime intent - or would
have ifthe Supreme Court had applied ordinary principles of contract law.
A few additional written examples of CNH's practical construction
of its obligation to retirees ought to be conclusive proof for any impartial
reader.
In 1980, the Case benefit specialist at the Burlington plant wrote to
the attorney for a surviving spouse that the survivor was "entitled to full
medical and dental coverage" "for her lifetime." 2 82 This same Case benethe same promise
fits representative wrote unequivocal letters containing
28 3
thereafter.
decade
a
than
more
for
of lifetime benefits
In 1983, a Case signatory to the 1974, 1977 and 1980 CBAs for the
Bettendorf plant wrote a memo describing benefits lifetime benefits for a
follows: "spouse
surviving spouse of a retiree on a disability pension 2as
84
life.'
Spouses
of
Balance
Ins.
Med.
+
option $135.33
At the Terre Haute plant, the benefits supervisor prepared worksheets
2 85 On these workdescribing the lifetime benefits available for retirees.
sheets, she wrote, sometimes handwritten and sometimes typed, "Medical: For Lifetime." 2 86 In 1984, she prepared a separate summary for a surviving spouse that her medical coverage "will also continue unchanged
for your lifetime . ".."287
In 1986, a corporate benefits representative wrote to an East Moline
her insurance "will be continued for you at no cost
surviving spouse that
2 88
for your lifetime."
280. See supra notes 208-19, 220-26.
281. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 222, at 15-27
(summarizing evidence of CNH's communications).
282. Deposition of Susan Nelson, Ex. 5, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.),
ECF No. 137.
283. Id.at Ex. 6, 8, 9, 10, 12.
284. Deposition of Sharon Schaeffer, Ex. 12, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D.
Mich.), ECF No. 139 (emphasis added).
285. Affidavit of Darla Clark at 4, Ex. D, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D.
Mich.), ECF No. 129-7.
286. Id.
287. Affidavit of Rosine Harmon, at 2 and attached summary, Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No.
04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 135.
288. Deposition of Sharon Shaeffer, Ex. 6 (Nov. 4, 1986 Letter - Sharon Shaeffer to Brenda
McBroom), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 139.
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In 1987, Case closed the Terre Haute plant. 28 9 Under, the plant closing agreement, there was an option for employees not yet.eligible for a
pension to "grow into" eligibility after the plant closed.2 9 ° , The benefits
supervisor sent the "grow in" employees a letter enclosing prescription
drug cards that expired the date their special early retirement was to begin.
She then wrote: "You will then receive a permanent (plastic) card from
Metropolitan which will reflect your lifetime coverage." 29 1 These retirees
later received MediMet cards containing the words "Lifetime Coverage"
or "Lifetime." 292 More than 100 retiring employees received benefit summaries that informed them that their various health insurance coverage
"continues unchanged., 29 3
In 1989, the benefits coordinator at Racine wrote tothe surviving
spouse of an active employee who died before retirement: "As Richard
was eligible to retire, you are entitled to an automatic spouse's pension
benefit for life. You are also entitled to free group coverage (unless you
remarry). 2 94
On December 18, 1992, the Racine benefits director wrote to a recently approved disability retiree: "Of course, all insurance benefits re2 95
main in effect as long as you are living."
In 1993, Case entered into a plant closing agreement relating to the
Wausau plant and Memphis (Southaven) parts depot. 296 Case's corporate
Human Resources Department prepared a summary entitled "Closed Plant
Benefits. '297 It stated that hourly employees who selected the special early
2 98
retirement option would "[r]eceive retiree medical benefits for life."

289. Affidavit of Darla Clark, supra note 285, at 3.
290. Id. at 4.
291. Id. at Ex. B.
292: Id. at Ex. C.
293. Id. at Ex. A; see also Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 54,
Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 146 (filed under seal).
. 294. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 59 (Oct. 19, 1989 Letter Karen Hamilton to Linda Knotek), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No.
151.
295. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 67 (Dec. 18, 1992 Letter Karen Hamilton to Donald Stifter), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No.
159.
296. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 46 (1993 Shutdown Agreement), Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 268-36.
297. Deposition of Judy Lojeski, supra note 210, at 126-29, Ex. 40 (Closed Plant Benefits).
298. Id;
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In 1996, the Racine benefits director wrote to an employee who had
been approved for disability benefits. 29 9 She told him that, if he remained
on long term disability until age sixty-five and died thereafter, his spouse
would be entitled to fifty-five percent of his pension and "group coverage
for her lifetime as if you had retired . ".."300
In 1997, the same Burlington plant benefits representative whose
1980 letter is described above, prepared a benefit summary for the spouse
30 1
of an active retiree who died on May 11, 1997 at the age of forty-nine.
The spouse was entitled to SIB (transition and bridge) benefits to age
sixty-two or remarriage. 30 2 She was also entitled to an automatic spousal
pension benefit, which would be offset by the SIB benefits until they expire, at which time the full amount would begin. 30 3 As to "Health ins.,"
medical, prescription drug, dental, vision + hearing
she wrote: "will30have
4
life."
for rest of
In March 2002, a corporate benefit administrator emailed an East
Moline benefits representative to confirm the insurance benefits available
30 5
to a surviving spouse of an employee who died while eligible to retire.
the email stated that "Denise will be covered for her
As to the spouse,
30 6
lifetime."
In November 2002, the same corporate benefits administrator responded to the question of another East Moline benefit representation
about an employee, stating: "It looks like he had over 30 years of service
so his wife would have insurance for life." 30 7

299. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 65 (April 26, 1996 IntraCompany Correspondence - Karen Hamilton to Jerome Kaisler), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 0470592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 157.
300. Id.
301. Deposition of Susan Nelson, supra note 282, Ex. 12.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Deposition of Karen Benson, Ex. 27 (Mar. 15, 2002 Email - Karen Benson to Jennifer Boyd
re Denise Strupp), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 130.
306. Id.
307. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 66 (Nov. 20, 2002 Email Karen Benson to Barbara Erenberger re Keith Hartman), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592
(E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 158.
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3.

The Transformation of "Compelling" Admissions to
"Loose Talk"

The court's central function in contract cases is to try to determine
the mutual intent of the parties at the time of contracting.3 °8 Any analysis
that excludes consideration of the actual, expressed understanding of one
contracting party of its obligations after the contract takes effect and for
decades before a controversy exists is inherently destructive of the judiciary's primary role in contract interpretation. In actuality, of course, no
"ordinary" rule supports such an analysis. In its purely ceremonial
approach to the 1998 CBA, Reese simply ignored interpretative rules courts
had ordinarily applied in the past.
This rule of interpretation - that the practical construction by the parties is of great significance in their determining intent - is a rule of evidence as well; all of the acts and statements of CNH confirming its "lifetime" obligation for retiree healthcare are statements against CNH's
interest under Fed. R. Evid. 804(3)309 as well as party admissions under
Fed. R. Evid. 801(D)(2). 3 10 There is a reason for these rules. Statements
and acts of a party against its pecuniary interest have always been considered reliable indicia of a party's actual intent. 3 11 A party can attempt to
explain away its words and its deeds, but they are nevertheless admissible
3 12
against the party.
Inherent in the plain meaning rule is an understandable reticence to
open up a contract to self-serving evidence from one party about what a
contract means when it has a plainly opposite meaning.3 1 3 But there is a
natural and critical difference between that kind of self-serving, post hoc
extrinsic evidence at odds with a contract's apparent plain meaning and

308. See supra notes 196-206.
309. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3)(A) ("Statement Against Interest. A statement that: ... a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because,
when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a
tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil
or criminal liability .... ").
310. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(d) ("An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered
against an opposing party and: ... was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the
scope of that relationship and while it existed.").
311. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3)(A).
'312. Id.
313. Stryker Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 842 F.3d 422,428 (6th Cir. 2016); Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 363 n.7 (3d Cir. 2014); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States,
226 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000); AM Int'l v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575
(7th Cir. 1995).
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objective, contemporaneous evidence about what a party always undera dispute. 3 14
stood its own contractualobligation to be before there is
This is the same distinction made in the rules of evidence between
self-serving testimony and admissions against interest. For example, in
Williamson v. United States, the Court held that the "most faithful reading" of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) is that it permits excision of self-serving
statements when they are made in a broader narrative that is generally self3 16 Statements - by
inculpatory. 3 15 The issue is one of trustworthiness.
word or deed - against a party's interest have the hallmarks of trustworthiness; self-serving statements do not.31 7
Professor Kniffin writes that extrinsic evidence is critical if the court
3 18 To her, the only
is actually interested in discerning the parties' intent.
3 19 "The
issue should be the weight accorded to the evidence presented.
extent to which the court is persuaded by a particular item of extrinsic
320 Because "[t]he
evidence is a function of the weight of that evidence."
court [that perceives a plain meaning in contract language] may, of course,
be mistaken. .."
The question should be not the admissibility of relevant extrinsic evidence, but an assessment of the weight of such evidence, including its
persuasive quality and cogency, which the court can accomplish only
after viewing it. This is true despite the fact that courts have often disof flimsy and untrustworthy evidence by labeling it as inadmissiposed
32 1
ble.
Under Tackett and Reese, the elevation of the CBA's general duration clause to a presumption against vesting has led to contortions by
judges who had once correctly seen a party's acts and words as illuminating its actual intent.
314. See Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that objective
manifestations of intent prevail over self-serving testimony); Philhall Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d
210, 215 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Contemporaneous facts, not self-serving testimony given years later, are
important in establishing intent.").
315. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994); see also Vincent v. Seabold,
226 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2000); Woodall v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 964 F.2d 361, 364-65
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 796 (7th Cir. 1988).
316. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 602, 605.
317. Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., Inc., 922 F.2d 272, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1991).
318. KNIFFIN, supra note 80, at 59.
319. Id.
320. Id. ("A party will not be permitted to build up an argument by means of self-serving statements. Such statements should be admissible against that party, however, as admissions against that
party's interest.").
. 321. Id.at60-61.
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For example, pre-Tackett, the Sixth Circuit in Cole v. ArvinMeritor,
Inc., noted that the district court's finding of vested retiree benefits was
confirmed by, inter alia, "substantial evidence of written assurances of
lifetime healthcare benefits," including "lifetime letters" sent by the employer to retirees for thirteen years, "for life" prescription cards issued for
twelve years, an employer booklet promising. "lifetime" healthcare benefits, other booklets and summary plan descriptions promising health benefits "during your retirement" and various "'oral "lifetime" assurances'
made over four decades by company officials." 322 Because the court concluded that the CBA contained an unambiguous promise of vested benefits, it did not consider this extrinsic evidence beyond noting that the evidence "weighs heavily in the favor of the plaintiffs and indicates the
defendants' intention to provide lifetime retiree healthcare benefits."3 23
After that 2008 decision, the employers' petition for rehearing was
then held in abeyance for eight years while the parties attempted to settle
their dispute. 324 After Tackett, the parties (not surprisingly) quickly
reached impasse; the employer's petition for rehearing was promptly
granted; and the Sixth Circuit reversed itself.325 In Cole v. Meritor, Inc.
Judge Gilman, writing for the majority, held that, retiree benefits, earlier
held to be clearly vested as a matter of law, had not vested at all - also as
a matter of law. 32 6 The retirees' position, once conclusive as to intent, was
no longer even a "fairly plausible" interpretation. 32 7 All of the evidence
of the employers' intent that retiree benefits were "lifetime" benefits devolved, the Sixth Circuit decided, into no more than "loose talk" devoid
3 28
of any evidentiary value.
Evidence that the Supreme Court has always been considered to be
entitled to "great, if not controlling, influence" can never be irrelevant or
inadmissible.3 2 9 Evidence that has always been "highly significant"3 3 ° in
the determination of intent can never be discounted as "loose talk., 33 1

322. Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (6th Cir. 2008).
323. Id. at 1075.
324. Cole v. Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d. 695 (6th Cir. 2017).
325. Id. at 696, 702.
326. Id. at 702.
327. Seeid
328. Id. at 702.
329. Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118 (1913).
330. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 346 (2010).
331. Cole, 855 F.3d at 702. Judge Gilman's 'analysis simply begs the following question - had
the employer kept its "actual intent" close to its vest, so it could disclose that "intent" at some future
date when it became convenient - that is, after having "fooled" the employeesand the union for
decades, CBA after CBA, with its "loose talk?" Apparently, this was the "solution" that satisfied
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When a court transforms what it once held to be compelling evidence of
a party's intent into "loose talk," the court has lost its bearings. It can no
longer claim to be an impartial arbiter of what contracts mean or what the
contracting parties intended.
Cole demonstrates the absurdity of the Tackett/Reese analysis - if
determining the parties' actual intent is the goal of judicial interpretation
of contracts. For decades, the parties to the CBAs in both Cole and Reese
operated under a common understanding that retiree health care benefits
were lifetime benefits. The employer's words and deeds over decades
gave meaning and content to the words chosen by the parties to express
their intent in the CBA. The union relied on the employer's words and
deeds because the employer had the same understanding of its lifetime
obligation. The union has no reason to question the meaning of or tinker
with the existing CBA language because the meaning of the language had
been settled by mutual agreement. In other words, the employer's statehad become inseparable from the operative intent of
ments and conduct 332
language.
the CBA
The employer's words and deeds - its express promises to employees
- also form the basis for the employee's performance of the conditions
precedent to the promise of lifetime healthcare - a working lifetime of
manual labor for the employer. The employer's words give solace and
security - and were intended to give solace and security - to survivors
spouses, depend on those promises for their sewho, as factory workers'
33 3
age.
old
in
curity
It is for these reasons, in addition to being admissions against interest, that evidence of an employer's words and deeds can never be dismissed as "loose talk." To the contrary, the employer's actions, in word
and deed, are probative admissions of the employer's intent concerning
the fundamental issue before the court. In Cole, as in Reese, this evidence
comes from those very persons whom the employer designated to communicate that intent to the union and to the employees. Courts may be
concerned that trials on what the employer intended may degenerate into
an after the fact "company said/union said" swearing contest. But, courts
the chaff.3 34
have always weighed evidence and sorted the wheat from

Judge Gilman in Cole. Id. It is not a solution consistent with the rules of evidence, "ordinary principles" of contract interpretation or the federal common law developed under Section 301. Id.
332. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960) (stating that this
understanding was the "common law of the shop" which became the contract).
333. Cole, 855 F.3d at 697-98.
334. See supra notes 315-21.
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That is what they are supposedto do.3 3 5 Of course,,that was not the issue
in either Cole or Reese - or in many of the other retiree cases. The only
evidence needed in Reese to prove CNH's intent was evidence of what
CNH said and what CNH did.3 36 To denigrate or ignore this evidence is
to abrogate the courts' core responsibility in contract cases as well as the
Anglo-American social contract and its foundation in the Rule of Law.
4.

Judge Sutton's Reese IIf Dissent -Undoing the Facts and
the Law

In his Reese I1 dissent, Judge Sutton discounted all the evidence of
CNH's intent because "most of it predates the relevant time period. 3 3 7
Judge Sutton then declared that the "relevant period" was July 1, 1994 and
April 1, 2005, the inclusive retirement dates of the class of retirees. 33 8
According to Judge Sutton, "[n]o amount of parol evidence regarding
prior agreements, including promises made to workers who retired in the
1970s and '80s, is probative of... a set of distinct promises made by a
new corporate parent for the first time in 1995, and then in altered form in
3 9
1998." 1

As with other aspects of Judge Sutton's dissent, the Reese III majority did not bother to address or counter his dismissal of CNH's words and
deeds. And, the Supreme Court refused to provide the retirees with an
opportunity to do so. But, consistent with other aspects of his dissent,
Judge Sutton's take on this issue has little to do with the actual facts or
the law - and nothing to do with the intent of the parties.
First, for example, Judge Sutton mis-characterized this evidence as
"parol evidence." 340 Parol evidence is generally "oral," not written or documentary evidence. 34 1 The evidence that Judge Sutton discounts (and
335. Pullman-Standard, Div. of Pullman v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982) ("Factfinding is
the basic responsibility of district court.").
336. There certainly was corroborating evidence from the union and from retirees and surviving
spouses, but the Reese retirees relied almost exclusively on what CNH said and did over three decades.
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra note 222, at
1527.
337. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese 111),
854 F.3d 877, 892 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., dissenting), rev'd 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.at 892.
341. Parol,XI OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 248 (2d ed. 1989). While Judge Sutton did not
explicitly rely on the "parol evidence rule," his reference to "prior agreements" indicates that is what
he had in mind. See Reese, 854 F.3d at 892 (Sutton, J. dissenting). But, the parol evidence rule
applies to "prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agreements, whose effect is to
add to, vary, modify, or contradict the terms of a writing." WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 33.1 at 862.
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342 consists of written party admissions - adexcluded from consideration)
missions against CNH's interest - made by CNH after the CBA was finalized, that gave giving meaning to identical language in the written
CBAs, provided while the CBAs were in effect, over a period of thirty
Supreme Court has held to be "of great, if not
years; evidence that the
34 3
influence."
controlling
Second, there was no "new corporate parent" after July 1, 1994. The
its 100
stated purpose of the 1994 IPO was so that Tenneco could sell344
percent equity ownership of Case Corporation stock to the public. After
parent;" it
the IPO was completed, Case Corporation had no "corporate
34 5 It was not
was a continuing, but stand alone, publicly held corporation.
indirectly merged with New Holland to
until 1999 that Case Corporation
346
form CNH Global N.V.

"the
The reason for the rule is to protect the primacy of the final agreement and to protect against
Quantum
doubtful veracity and uncertain memory of interested witnesses." Id.(quoting Evenson v.
testimony,
Indus., Inc., 687 N.W.2d 241, 244 (N.D. 2004)). But, the parol evidence rule does not bar
words to mean.
oral or written, as to what the parties to a written agreement intended their chosen
Gumport v. AT&T Techs., 89 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1996); KNIFFIN, supranote 80, § 24.10 at 82,
§ 24.11.
because
342. Professor Kniff'm states that "[w]hen a court refuses to examine extrinsic evidence
a decision
the court believes that it perceives a clear, plain meaning of a disputed contract term, this is
of course,
that such evidence will automatically be deemed to have no weight at all. The court may,
evidence
be mistaken... because no word can ever have a fixed meaning, and the proffered extrinsic
not the
be
should
question
The
court.
the
to
occurred
not
had
that
may reveal a possible meaning
includadmissibility of relevant extrinsic evidence, but an assessment of the weight of such evidence,
60-61.
at
80,
note
supra
KNIFFIN,
"
....
cogency
and
ing its persuasive quality
343. Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118 (1913).
Mich.
344. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164, 2004 WL 3661450, at *3 (E.D.
Mar. 9, 2004).
the
345. Id. Even if there had been a "new corporate parent," that fact would not have affected
labor
liability of Case Corporation. It is an elementary principle of both corporate law and federal
See
law that a transfer of corporate stock has no implications on underlying corporate obligations.
& ImproveAnspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith Land
Co., 645 F.2d
ment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988); Tucker v. Paxson Mach.
1367 (4th
620, 622 (8th Cir. 1981) (corporate law). See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360,
845 F.2d
NLRB,
v.
Inc.
EPE,
1989);
Cir.
(7th
752
739,
F.2d
887
NLRB,
v.
Cir. 1995); Esmark, 'Inc.
(federal
483, 488 (4th Cir. 1988); Miami Foundry Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 587, 589 (6th Cir. 1982)
labor law).
Aug. 29,
346. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, 2007 WL 2484989, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
was
provision
contract
disputed
the
after
and
when
intent
the
to
look
courts
2007). In any case,
v. ANC
negotiated, even if there had been a subsequent change in ownership. Seiden Assocs., Inc.,
corpoHoldings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir. 1992) (remanding contract action against successor
Bartendration for a determination of "what the original contracting parties intended"); Rest. Emps.,
ers & Hotel Serv. Emps. Health & Welfare Pension Tr. v. Ferrymen, No. 92-36642, 1994 WL 35020,
look
at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) (stating that to discern parties intent to a CBA, court "may properly
negotiated
actually
(who
predecessor
his
of
practice
the
to
but
behavior,
plaintiff's]
[the
not only to
the contract)").
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Judge Sutton's license with the facts is all the more troubling be
cause, like most issues in Yolton and Reese, the issue of the corporate continuity had been exhaustively litigated and finally decided. In Yolton, the
district court held that Case Corporation was the same entity after the July
1, 1994 IPO as it had been before - and not even the name had changed.34 7
The following are the actual facts as determined in Yolton.
After the district court issued a preliminary injunction against El
Paso in late 2003,348 El Paso filed a motion for reconsideration asserting
that CNH, not El Paso, was directly obligated to the pre-IPO retirees.3 4 9
CNH argued that it was a new corporate entity, one that did not exist before July 1, 1994, and therefore, it had no obligation to pre-IPO retirees.3 5 °
The district court granted El Paso's motion, holding that pre-IPO retirees
were likely to succeed on their claim that CNH was "merely a disguised
continuation or alter ego of the company which employed Plaintiffs or
Plaintiffs' spouses and which retained the old Case Corporation's labor
law obligations." 35 1 The Sixth Circuit, after a detailed examination of the
various "factors indicate that CNH America is, for purposes of this case,
the alter ego of JI Case," affirmed the district court.35 2
At the close of discovery in Yolton, CNH moved for summary judgment asserting again that it was not contractually liable for the healthcare
benefits of pre-1IPO retirees. 3 53 After extensive evaluation of the evidence,
the district court denied the motion, concluding that "CNH is the same
entity that employed Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' spouses and therefore is contractually obligated for the costs of Plaintiffs' retiree health insurance benefits." 354 In a separate opinion issued the same day, the district court
granted the retirees' motion for summary judgment against CNH.35 5

347. Yolton, 2004 WL 3661450 at *3.
348. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
349. Defendant El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Co.'s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to LR
7.1(g) and Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D.
Mich.), ECF No. 82.
350. CNH America LLC's Response to El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Co.'s.Motion for Reconsideration at 6-8, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 94.
351. Yolton, 2004 WL 3661450. at *4.
352. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 588 (6th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549
U.S. 1019 (2006). JI Case was the original name of the company, which was then renamed Case
Corporation in 1990. -Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164, 2008 WL 2566860, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2008).
353. CNH America LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1,Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline
Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 262.
354. Yolton, 2008 WL 2566860 at *10.
355. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164, 2008 WL 2566861 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
7, 2008).
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Third, the "set of promises" in the 1995 and 1998 CBAs was no different from the 1990 CBA that CNH "assumed" in 1994. The Judge Sutton who pronounced them different in Reese III ignored what the same
Judge Sutton wrote about this very issue in Reese L In Reese I, Judge
Sutton relied on Yolton in affirming the district court's entry of summary
3 56 In Reese I, Judge Sutton wrote that "past is
judgment for the retirees.
prologue;" that "Yolton arose from a nearly identical CBA;" and that
"promisefor promise, the two sets of commitments [in the 1990 CBA and
the 1998 CBA] are effectively identical;" and that "[l]ike Yolton, this case
...involves a health-care benefits plan with identical language concern...."357
ing entitlement to benefits upon retirement
In Reese I, Judge Sutton stated that this was not surprising because
the "Yolton CBA involved retirees who worked at the same plant as todays retirees and concerned an employer that was different in name Case's former parent company, Tenneco - but in few other meaningful
ways." 3 58 After reviewing the "identical language concerning entitlement
to benefits upon retirement" in Yolton, Judge Sutton stated: "[A]bove all,
[Yolton] concerns employees who worked in virtually identical circumin the same plant) to the
stances (apparently making the same products
359
retired.
Yolton employees before each group
In his Reese I assessment, Judge Sutton got one fact wrong, but it
only underscores the bankruptcy of his Reese III pronouncements. The
name of the "employer" never changed during this period. The signatory
360 The signatory to the 1993 Exto the 1990 CBA was Case Corporation.
36 1 The signatory to the 1995
tension Agreement was Case Corporation.
CBA was Case Corporation and the signatory to the 1998 CBA was Case
Corporation. 36 2 Three of Case's corporate employees, Paul Crist, Case's
corporate Director of Labor Relations, Marc Castor and Judy Lojeski,
36 3 Mr. Crist alone signed
signed all three CBAs for "Case Corporation."
36 4
the 1993 Extension Agreement for "Case Corporation."

356.
U.S. ,
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Reese v. CNH America LLC (Reese 1),574 F.3d 315, 322-23 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd 583
138 S.Ct. 761 (2018).
Id.(emphasis added).
Id. at 322.
Id.at 323.
See 1990, 1995 and 1998 Central Agreement Signature Pages, supra note 249.
Deposition of Tim Haas, supra note 243, Ex. 5.
1990, 1995 and 1998 Central Agreement Signature Pages, supra note 249.
Id.
Deposition of Tim Haas, supra note 243, Ex. 5 at 7.
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Every benefit representative who made the post-IPO admissions had
been employed in the same position before the IPO. 365 Karen Benson,
who made the 2002 admissions,3 6 6 was employed at Case beginning in
1989 and in the corporate benefits department in the fall of 1993.367 Karen
Hamilton, the benefit rep at the Racine tractor plant who made the 1996
admission, 368 had made identical statements regarding lifetime medical
benefits prior to the IPO, while acting in the same capacity. 3 69 Likewise,
Susan Nelson, a long-term benefits representative at the Burlington plant,
who prepared the 1997 "lifetime" summary, 370 had sent similar letters to
retirees and surviving spouses, beginning at least since 1980.371
Because of its importance, the Yolton retirees spent enormous efforts
litigating the corporate continuity issue to final conclusion.3 7 2 All for
naught. In Reese III, Judge Sutton made up his own facts - and ignored
his previous opinion - to fashion a "theory" of why critical, relevant evidence of intent was worthless. This was the defective analysis on which
the Supreme Court relied to negate the contractual bargain.
The pertinent contractual inquiries are: 1) what did the parties mean
when they first negotiated the language in 1971, the language that is in
every CBA through 1998; 37 3 and 2) what was the parties' understanding
of Case's obligation in the performance of the contract before the controversy arose.374 If the role of the court, as Williston says, is to place itself
in the position of the parties and "look forward from the date when the
parties entered the bargain, not backward from some vantage point of a
future day, ' '375 the written evidence of how the obligatedparty views its
365. As noted above, the effective date of the IPO, July 1, 1994, separated the Yolton and Reese
cases. See supra note 248.
366. See supra notes 305-07.
367. See Deposition of Karen Benson, supra note 305, at 11-12.
368. See supra notes 299-300.
369. Oct. 19, 1989 Letter - Karen Hamilton to Linda Knotek, supra note 294.
370. See supra notes 301-04.
371. See supra notes 282-83.
372. For example, Plaintiffs a detailed response to CNH's motion for summary judgment, relying on dozens of corporate and other documents they had obtained, to show the corporate continuity.
Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to CNH's Motion for Summary Judgment, Yolton v. El Paso Tenn.
Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 313. In preparation, Plaintiffs' had submitted 715
Requests of Admission to CNH, focusing on every aspect of the corporate continuity of Case Corporation before arid
after July 1, 1994. Id. at Ex. 1. CNH Answers to the Requests were attached to the
Response. Id. at Ex. 3. Plaintiffs also relied on the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of former Case executive
Richard Christman on April 18, 2007. Id. at Ex 10.
373. See supra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
374. See supra Section V.E.
375. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 31:9 at 541. In Reese, the Court stated that, "[i]f the
parties meant to vest health care benefits for life, they easily could ... sa[y] so in the text." Reese,
583 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. at 766. Of course, it is not the Court's role to second guess how the parties

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

55

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 37:1

the bargain is indispensable in deterobligation from the date it37entered
6
intent.
parties'
mining that
In Reese III, Judge Sutton got it all wrong - the facts, the evidentiary
rules andthe ordinary principles of contract law. By adopting his dissent
in a per curiam summary reversal, the Supreme Court precluded any
chance of correction and, at the same time, reached a decision entirely at
odds with the cardinal objective of contract interpretation - to discern and
enforce the intent of the parties.
The irony is that retiree litigants in the Sixth Circuit seldom relied on
the Yard-Man inference at all and never counted on Yard-Man as the sole
proof of their cases. 37 7 They did not rely on self-serving statements of
union representatives. To the contrary, they typically presented the explicit, contemporaneous employer admissions like those of Case's corporate representatives. The author, in litigating Yolton and Reese and other
earlier retiree cases, intentionally relied on the ordinary principle of conhighly significant,
tract law that the words and actions of the employer are378
Relying on this
intent.
employer's
the
if not controlling, evidence of
"ordinary" principle of contract law, the author spent countless hours examining hundreds of thousands pages of documents and thousands of inthe emdividual employee and benefit files uncovering evidence of379
After
spouses.
surviving
and
retirees
to
ployer's written commitments
the
as
viewed
traditionally
Reese, that same kind of probative evidence

supra
expressed their intention - otherwise oblique promises would never be enforced. See KNIFFIN,
of
musing
hoc
post
this
bargaining,
collective
of
context
the
note 80, § 24.7 at 37. But, especially in
the appropriate
how the parties should have written their promises more than forty years earlier turns
the vantage
inquiry on its head. Id. The issue is not what the parties could have done differently from
understood it
point of 2018, but what they did and what they intended in 1971 and what Case (CNH)
("The cardinal
obligation to be at that time and during the decades that followed. See generally id
the intenrule with which all interpretation begins is that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain
tion of the parties.").
376. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 31:9 at 541; see also supra notes 264-79.
su377. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability,
in Support of
pra note 222, at 8 n.7 (stating "no need to apply the [Yard-Man] inference here"); Brief
Tenn. Pipeline
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability at 9 n.7, Yolton v. El Paso
inference
Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 268 (stating "reliance on any such [Yard-Man]
... is entirely unnecessary").
note
378. See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra
Yolton
18-19,
at
Injunction
Preliminary
for
Motion
of
Support
222, at 14-15; Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in
v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 02-75164 (E.D. Mich.), R. 76.
amicus brief
379. The author summarized some of that evidence, presented in four cases, in the
In Support
he filed in Tackett on behalf of various Retiree Committees. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
Committee
Retiree
Yolton
and
Committee
Retiree
Golden
of Respondents, Fox Retiree Committee,
at 13-36, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
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"sure[st] way to find out what the parties mean ' 380 - cannot. even be considered; it must be discarded as irrelevant "loose talk.'381
F. Courts, in InterpretingContracts,Should Construe All
Agreements Relating to the Same Subject TogetherAs One
Contract.
Unlike many private contracts, any mature collective bargaining relationship is the result of a series of CBAs, often going back decades, carrying many of the same provisions forward verbatim. 382 The latest CBA
in that series is not a standalone agreement that can be interpreted in isolation, but the product of years of negotiations, interim agreements and
mutual understandings. 3 83 There are often events that require, or result in,
ancillary agreements, negotiated for particular purposes.3 8 4 At Case, for
example, the company closed various facilities over the years and entered
into shutdown agreements with the UAW that included special early retirement programs for employees, programs that included provisions for
continuing retiree healthcare benefits. 385 Case also offered early retirement incentives to reduce its workforce which resulted in negotiations relating to enhanced pensions and continuing healthcare for departing employees. 386 The Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court in Reese ignored all
of these agreements.
Under "ordinary" contract principles, these related agreements are
relevant in determining the parties' intent. According to Williston:
[W]hen the same parties execute two instruments conceming the same
subject matter, the writings may, under some circumstances, be regarded
as one contract and may be construed together, whether they were made
simultaneously or at different times, the fact that they were made or

380. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1877).
381. Cole v. Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 2017).
382. See supra note 207; see also Cole v. ArvinMeritor Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (6th Cir.
2008) (describing CBA history from 1965 through 2000); Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592,
2007 WL 2484989, at *1-3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2007) (describing the CBA provisions from 1971
through 2005); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 954 F. Supp. 1173, 1178-79 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (summarizing CBA history from 1965 through 1980 at various locations).
383. See supra note 379.
384. See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461-62 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(describing shutdown agreements and early retirement incentive programs).
385. Id.
386. Id.
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if they are related to and were
dated at different times being3 insignificant
87
part of the same transaction.
This principle is particularly applicable where the contract is a CBA
because of the very nature of a CBA. In TransportationEmployees v. Union Pacific R. Co., 38 8 the Court stated: "In order to interpret [a CBA], it is
necessary to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining
agreements, as well as the practice, usage and custom pertaining to all
such agreements."
1.

The Plant Shutdown Agreements and the Termination of
the CBAs

Over the years, CNH closed several of its facilities. In 1987, two
years after CNH purchased the tractor division of International Harvester,
CNH closed its existing factories in Bettendorf, Iowa, Rock Island, Illi389
In 1993, it closed its Wausau, Wisconnois and Terre Haute, Indiana.
and part of its Hinsdale, Illinois endepot
parts
Memphis
sin factory, its
3 90
In 2002, following its 1999 merger with New
gineering facility.
combine factory on the Mississippi
Holland, CNH closed its massive
39 1
Illinois.
River in East Moline,
On each of these occasions, CNH and the UAW entered into a plant
closing agreement. 3 92 In each case, the parties agreed on special plant
shutdown options that affected employees could elect, including: 1) remaining on the master recall list (to be relocated to other CNH plants); 2)
electing a severance option that included a cash buy out; or 3) electing an
enhanced early retirement option available to those employees not yet el3 93
Individuals who
igible to retire under the terms of the pension plan.
selected the enhanced pension option would receive "special early

387. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 30:26 at 321-22.
388. Transportation-Communication Emps. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 161
(1966).
389. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460-61 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
390. Id.
391. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592, 2007 WL 2484989, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,
2007).
392. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 45 (1987 Shutdown
Agreement), Ex. 46 (1993 Shutdown Agreement), Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., No. 0275164 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 268-35, 268-36; Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Ex. 47 (2002 Shutdown Agreement), Reese v. CNI Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.),
ECF No. 129-39.
393. See 1987 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 9; 1993 Shutdown Agreement, supra
note 392, at 12; 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supranote 392, at 14.
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retirement" benefits that were outlined in the Pension Agreement and
Plan. 3 94 The option included the "Retiree Insurances that accompany such
Special Early Retirement," specifically referencing the "Pension Agree39 5
ment and Plan and Insurance Agreement.,
Under the 2002 East Moline Shutdown Agreement, employees could
"grow into" a special retirement shutdown benefit for a period up to five
years after the plant closed.39 6 This 2002 Shutdown Agreement provided
that the retiree would have "retiree medical beginning at age 55", the age
39 7
when the employee "grew into" the special early retirement benefits.
These shutdown agreements expressly provided for the termination
of the CBAs at the facilities that were being closed. The 1993 Shutdown
Agreement, for example, stated:
Upon ratification of the Shutdown Agreement, as noted above, the current Labor Agreement between the Company and the Union (the stated
term of which is June 2, 1990 through October 2, 1993, and Extension
Agreement) shall terminate as it relates to Wausau and Memphis and
shall have
no further application to the affected employees at
398
Hinsdale.
The 2002 East Moline Shutdown siinilarly provided that, as to East
Moline, the 1998 CBA "shall terminate and be of no further effect provided, however, that this Shutdown Agreement and the benefit plans and
agreements related thereto shall not terminate and continue to apply to the
extent they govern and provide rights and benefits to separated employ3 99
ees."
The 2002 East Moline Shutdown Agreement provided that: "The
economic closedown benefits established and set forth in this Shutdown
Agreement shall not be altered by any subsequent agreements in any future negotiations. "400 The 1993 Plant Shutdown Agreement had an iden40 1
tical provision.

394. See 1987 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at Appx B; 1993 Shutdown Agreement,
supra note 392, at Appx B; 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supranote 392, at 41.
395. See 1987 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at Appx B; 1993 Shutdown Agreement,
supra note 392, at Appx B; 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supranote 392, at 41.
396. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 46, 51-52. Under the 1993 Shutdown Agreement, the "grow in" period was two years. See 1993 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at Ex. IOption B.
397. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 50, 51.
398. See 1993 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 28.
399. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 20.
400. Id.at 19.
401. See 1993 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 9.
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Thus, under the plant closing agreements, the underlying CBAs, including both the "concurrent" clause(s) and the general duration clause of
the CBA, were terminated while the GBP (referred to as the "Insurance
Agreement" or "benefit plans and agreements" in the shutdown agreements) remained as the source for the future and continuing benefits for
employees retiring under the shutdown agreements.
In Reese, the Supreme Court held that the CBA's general duration
clause, applicable to the GBP through the "concurrent" clause, was the
for its decision - the factor that made the case so
determinative factor
"straightforward., 40 2 The termination of the CBA in the plant closing
agreements, with the concomitant elimination of the "concurrent" clause
andthe general duration clause, dramatically changes the legal landscape
- at least for employees retiring under the plant closing agreements.
Under the plant closing agreements, the parties' intent is unambiguous. Even though the CBA was terminated, "Retiree Insurances," those
that accompanied the special early retirement option, and referenced the
4 °3 In
"Pension Agreement and Plan and Insurance Agreement," were not.
the 2002 East Moline Shutdown Agreement, the parties agreed that "this
Shutdown Agreement and the benefit plans and agreements related thereto
shall not terminate" and will "continue to apply to the extent they govern
and provide rights to separated employees."40 4 The 1993 and the 2002
Shutdown Agreements both provided that the economic benefits they provided could "not be altered" in any future negotiations. 4°5 If there were
any remaining doubt, CNH prepared a "Closed Plant Benefits" summary
shortly before the 1993 Shutdown Agreement. Under "Special Early Rethe summary stated: "Receive retiree medical benefits for
tirement,"
40 6
life."
In the three Reese decisions, there is no discussion of the impact of
closing agreements on the duration of retiree healthcare benethe 4plant
fits. 07 As long as all CNH retirees had lifetime healthcare benefits, there
402. CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 761, 765-66 (2018).
403. See supra notes 394-95.
404. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supranote 392, at 22.
405. Id. at 21; 1987 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392.
406. Deposition of Judy Lojeski, supra note 210, Ex. 40 (Closed Plant Benefits).
407. In Reese v. CNHAmerica LLC, Judge Sutton rejected Plaintiffs argument, and the district
court's opinion, that the 2002 East Moline Shutdown Agreement prohibited CNH from reasonably
modifying benefits, stating that the closing agreement did not mention retiree health care benefits.
Reese v. CNH America LLC (Reese I), 694 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2012), rev'd 583 U.S. _, 138 S.
Ct. 761 (2018). In doing so, Judge Sutton simply refused to acknowledge those parts of the agreement
that did mention retiree health care benefits. Compare Id., with 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra
note 392, at 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51. Judge Sutton also ignored the fact that the major reason for
maintaining the GBP (while terminating the CBA) was that the GBP described retiree healthcare
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was no harm done to the 700 or so Wausau, Memphis, Hinsdale or East
Moline retirees (or to their spouses and dependents) whose continuing
benefits were "established and set forth" in the shutdown agreements and
"shall not be altered by any subsequent agreements." 40 8 But, by pronouncing the case "straightforward," the Supreme Court foreclosed any factual
development these retirees had to an independent contractual claim to lifetime benefits under the shutdown agreements.
Before Tackett, in Temme v. Bemis Company, Inc.,409 the Seventh
Circuit interpreted a plant closing agreement as providing lifetime retiree
medical benefits. 41 0 In that closing agreement, the court found "straight411
forward indications" of the parties' intent to create lifetime benefits.
While, the court stated, "a presumption against vesting is-a natural fit"
with CBAs because CBAs are short term agreements, such a presumption
is ,less persuasive" for shutdown agreements where the parties are "aware
that they are establishing and settling claims for employees in a permanent
and enduring fashion." 4 12
In Temme, the court relied on an earlier decision involving a shutdown agreement, Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc.4 13 In Zielinski, the
district court granted summary judgment for Pabst, reasoning that there
was no statement in either the CBA or the shutdown agreement that
healthcare benefits vested.4 14 The Seventh Circuit stated: "We do not find
this reasoning persuasive. The shutdown agreement contains ... no termination date and we cannot find any basis for interpolating one. ' 4 15 The
Seventh Circuit continued that CBAs:
being short term agreements are presumed not to create rights or duties
that continue after the agreement's termination date. The rights that the
plaintiffs assert in this case originated in the collective bargaining agreement but were carried forward into the shutdown agreement, which, un4 16
like a collective bargaining agreement, has no end date.

benefits and retiree healthcare was one of the very few, and clearly the most important, continuing
economic benefit that the-plant closing agreement addressed. Reese 11, 694 F.3d at 686.
408. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 19; 1993 Shutdown Agreement, supra note
392, at 9.
409. Temme v. Bemis Co., 622 F.3d 730, 739 (7th Cir. 2010). 410. Id.
411. Id.at 736.
412. Id.
413. Id.; see also Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., 463 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2006).
414. Zielinski, 463 F.3d at 617.
415. Id.
416. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

61

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 37:1

reThe Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and
4 17
manded for further proceedings on the appropriate level of benefits.
The entire premise of Reese was that the "concurrent" clause unam4 18
biguously limited retiree healthcare benefits to the term of the CBA.
Under the plant closing agreements, that premise, dubious as it was, had
been eliminated by express language terminatingthe CBAs as it pertained
to employees retiring under those agreements. Under the shutdown agreements, retiree healthcare benefits continued despite and often commenced
long after the termination of the CBA. 4 19 The shutdown agreements contained the further contract promise that those economic benefits "shall not
420
be altered by any subsequent agreements in any future negotiations."
With the termination of the CBAs, the GBP no longer ran "concurrently"
with the CBA, but continued notwithstandingthe CBA expiration. 421 For
employees retiring under the plant closing agreements, the GBP, which
explicitly continued after the termination of the CBA, was freed from any
presumptive constraints in the CBAs.
Of course, it does not make sense that CNH would agree to lifetime
healthcare benefits only for those persons who left employment under a
special early retirement option created under the plant shutdown agreement. It does not make sense that CNH would give better benefits to those
employees who had too few years or were too young to qualify for a reg42 2
ular pension than to those who were older and had worked far longer.
It was for this reason that the Reese retirees cited the plant shutdown
42 3
agreements as proof that all retirees had lifetime health care benefits.
After the Supreme Court decision, the retirees filed a motion to remand the case to the district court for consideration of whether the shutdown agreements independently vested benefits in those retirees who re4 25 Inother
tired under them. 4 24 The court of appeals denied the motion.
words, the Sixth Circuit summarily refused to allow the district court to
conduct even a ceremonial analysis into whether employees retiring under
417. Id.at 621.
418. CNH Indus. N.V.v. Reese, 583 U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018).
419. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51.
420. Id. at 19.
421. Id. at 20.
422. See Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1996) ("it would be anomalous for the defendant to guarantee lifetime health coverage to retirees with only a couple of years
of service while neglecting to provide equal benefits to pensioners with dozens of years of service.").
423. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, supra note
222, at 26-30.
424. Appellees' Motion for Remand to the District Court for Consideration of Undecided Issues,
Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., No. 15-2382 (6th Cir.), ECF 80-1.
425. Order, Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., No. 15-2382 (6th Cir Aug. 27, 2018), ECF No. 83-2.
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the shutdown agreements had an independent contractual right to vested
4 26
healthcare benefits.
2.

The Voluntary Termination of Employment Program

CNH offered a special early retirement program in 1991 and 1992,
where employees could receive an enhanced pension and severance if they
retired voluntarily. 42 7 In calculating the cost of that program, CNH determined that 2,624 employees would be eligible to grow into the early special pension benefit with retiree insurance beginning at age 55; that is,
employees who were age 50 at the time could grow into the benefit at age
55.428 CNH assumed that such a retiree would live to an average of 74
years and that the cost of retiree insurance would be more than $112 mil4 29
lion.
At informational meetings explaining the VTEP program in 1991
and 1992, CNH passed out a summary describing the benefits. 4 30 The
summary stated: "the surviving spouse will continue coverage for all med'431
ical, dental, vision, etc. benefits for life."
G. ContractsAre Construedto Give Meaning to All Provisions
Without RenderingAny Terms Meaningless
"A contract must be construed as a whole so as to not render any
terms meaningless and a construction that gives a reasonable meaning to
each phrase and clause and harmonizes all provisions is preferred over a
construction that leaves some of the provisions without function or
432
sense."
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, the Court stated that it
is a "cardinal principle of contract construction that a document should be

426. The Sixth Circuit denied the retirees' petition for rehearing en bane. Order, Reese v. CNH
Industrial N.V., No. 15-2382 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2018), ECF No. 87-1
427. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
428. Deposition of Tim Haas, supra note 243, Ex. 23.
429. Id.
430. See Deposition of Thomas Graham, Ex. 6 (1991 Special Early Retirement Seminar), Ex. 19
(1992 Retirement Seminar), Reese v. CNH Global N.V., No. 04-70592 (E.D. Mich.), ECF No. 12910.
431. Id.Ex. 6 at4,Ex. 19 at6.
432. Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 795 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Missouri law); see also Aeroground Inc. v. Centerpoint Props. Trust, 738 F.3d 810, 813 (7th
Cir. 2013) (stating that the court must "seek to give effect to 'each clause and each word used,' without rendering any terms meaningless") (emphasis added).
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read to give effect 3to all of its provisions and to render them consistent
43
with each other."
According to Williston: "A contract will be read as a whole and every
4
part will be read with reference to the whole."4 3 "An interpretation that
gives effect to all provisions of the contract is preferred to one which renders part of the writing superfluous, useless or inexplicable. A court will
interpret a contract in a435manner that gives reasonable meaning to all its
provisions if possible."
In Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit held that the contract promise to one
group of retirees, that they would have healthcare benefits beginning at
age 65, would be illusory if they retired at age 55 and the employer's
promise was limited to the term of the CBA.4 36 Tackett criticized YardMan's use of the "illusory" contract principle, stating that it implicates the
concept of consideration and that, as long as there is some consideration
' 43 7 Tackett
from the employer, the contract is, by definition not "illusory.
continued that, if the CBA "benefits some class of retirees, then it may
4 38 Tackett concluded
serve as consideration for the union's promises."
that Yard-Man's interpretation was "particularly inappropriate in the context of collective-bargaining agreements, which are negotiated on behalf
often include
of a broad category of individuals and consequently will
4 39
employees."
of
category
some
to
inapplicable
provisions
Yard-Man does not address the issue of consideration; it was instead
concerned with looking at the contract as a whole and construing every
term as having independent meaning, as required by "ordinary rules" of
contract interpretation. 440 Yard-Man determined that the promise to provide benefits to retirees beginning at age 65 would be illusory - that is, it
would have no meaning, it would be "superfluous," for anyone who retired before age 62 during the three-year CBA. 4 4 1
433.
434.

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 32:5 at 692.
Id. at 704-07.
UAW v. Yard Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied465 U.S. 1007

435.
436.
(1984).
437. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 440-41 (2015).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Yard Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1479-80.
441. Id.at 1480-81, (citing to Cordovan Associates, Inc. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290 F.2d 858
(6th Cir. 1961)). CordovanAssociates did not address a situation where there was a complete lack of
consideration. Cordovan Associates, 290 F.2d at 860. There, the issue concerned the meaning the
term "prevailing prices" for tires purchased under a contract with a chain store. Id. The defendant
argued that the term meant the price it had charged under the contract rather than the lower price it
charged its other chain store customer. Id. The court determined that it meant the lowest price that it
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It is in this context that, in characterizing Yard-Man's analysis as
coming under the "illusory" promise doctrine, Tackett missed the point.
And, while Tackett is right that CBAs are different from ordinary contracts, it completely failed to comprehend that difference. Under federal
labor law, unions bargain on behalf of the entire bargaining unit and owe
each member of that unit a duty of fair representation. 4 42 Unlike ordinary
contracts unions do not seek benefits primarily for themselves. 44 3 Instead,
unions, as the statutory bargaining agent of the employees, are required to
act in the interest of the employee in negotiating their terms and conditions
of employment - wages, seniority rights, working conditions and benefits. 4 4 4 Individual employees, who ratify the CBAs, are the primary beneficiaries of the employer's promises under the CBA.4 4 5
The union's promises to an employer under a CBA are minimal - for
instance, the union agrees to arbitrate rather than litigate disputes and to
use its best efforts to prevent work stoppages during the term of a CBA.44 6
The real consideration to the employer is the promise that the employees
will perform in accordance with the terms of the CBA. 447 In return for that
performance, the employer promises wages and benefits for the hours and
years the employee works.4 4 8
If the employer fails to perform, the union and active employees generally have recourse through the collectively-bargained grievance procedure. 449 And, under certain circumstances, employees can sue the employer directly for breach of contract under Section 301 .450 And retirees,
who are no longer members of the bargaining unit, have a direct cause of

charged to the other customer, regardless of whether the contract referenced the other customer or the
price charged to it. Id.
442. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1967).
443. See generallyLewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 468 (1960) (stating that collective bargaining agreements are different from third party beneficiary contracts and go far beyond the
mere performance of its promise to that third party).
444. In a decision ignored by Tackett, the Supreme Court held that CBAs are not ordinary third
party contracts and are not subject to the same defenses as private third party contracts. Lewis, 361
U.S. at 459, 468. Lewis identified that the employer's interest in providing such things as retiree insurance as rooted in the "commonplace of modern industrial relations for employers to provide security for employees and their families to enable them to meet problems arising from unemployment,
illness, old age or death." Id. Thus, the promise goes from the employer directly to its individual
employees. Id.
445. Id.
446. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 219-21 (1979) (detailing history of
union's obligations under arbitration/no-strike clause in CBA).
447. Id. at219.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 216.
450. Id.; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
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if the employer breaches a
action under Section 301 against the employer
451
benefits.
provide
promise under a CBA to
Yard-Man was viewing the issue from the point of the employee, not
452 Thus, Yard-Man
from the perspective of the two contracting parties.
considered that, because a retiree is a third-party beneficiary to the CBA
and has an individual contract right under Section 301, the focus of
whether the employer's promise is meaningless or illusory is on particular
4 53 When the
employees, not the union or the bargaining unit as a whole.
employee has fully performed the condition precedent for that promise a lifetime of industrial labor in exchange for the employer's promised performance at retirement - the issue is not whether the employer performed
45 4
other promises made to other employees covered by the CBA.
Under the "illusory" promise doctrine, which appears to be distinct
from the rule that contracts are to be interpreted so that no provision is
meaningless, "[a]n illusory promise is one where the promisor is 'not obligated to do anything in consideration of the other party's promise or
performance." 4 55 So, if CNH is not obligated to do anything after a CBA
expires in consideration of a retired employee's performance, the promise
of healthcare while eligible for or receiving a pension is illusory.
While the promise of benefits through the end of a CBA is "some"
consideration for a lifetime of work, there are instances where - even then
- the employer would be obligated to provide nothing. For instance, an
employee retires shortly before a CBA expires but the retirement does not
become effective until the first of the month following the expiration of
the CBA. If an employer is not obligated to provide any retiree healthcare
because the contract expired before retirement, that is an illusory promise.
But, it seems absurd to think that even a few days or even a few months
of healthcare is actually adequate consideration for a lifetime of work.
Another illustration of an illusory promise is in the various shutdown
agreements where the UAW and CNH agreed to the terms covering the
closing of its facilities and the termination of the CBA at those locations. 4 56 In the 2002 East Moline Shutdown Agreement, for example, employees could choose to "grow into" certain "special early retirement"
451. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404
U.S. 157, 180-82 (1971).
452. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 (6th Cir. 1983).
453. Id. at 1481.
454. Id.
455. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carey Transp., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 888, 921 (W.D. Mich.
2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 at 195 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981));
CORB1N ON CONTRACTS § 16 at 24 (one vol. ed. 1952).
456. See supra notes 389-401.
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programs. 45 7 Under the 2002 Shutdown Agreement, employees could select this option if they were 50 years old and had 9.1 years of credited
service. 4 58 If they qualified, they would be entitled to two benefits: a "special early retirement" pension benefit plus the "retiree insurances that accompany such Special Early Retirement. '4 59 Under these options, the benefits included "retiree medical beginning at age 55.,,460 These employees
signed a plant shutdown option sheet stating: "This also means that... I
will be eligible to enroll in retiree insurance at the time I start my retirement.', 4 61 CNH and the employee who accepted this option understood
that both the pension and health care benefits would begin at age 55 - up
to five years after the termination of the CBA at their plant locations.
If these benefits terminated with the end of the CBA, an event occurring up to five years before the benefits were to take effect, those benefits
would be, by definition, illusory. And, CNH would retain the millions it
had allocated for that obligation. This is what Tackett and Reese permitted
CNH under so-called "ordinary" principles of contract law.
In his Reese III dissent, Judge Sutton discussed the two FAS 106
letters, negotiated in 1993 and 1995.462 As noted above, these letters,
which CNH collectively bargained with the UAW, stated that CNH would
pay a fixed amount per person for retiree healthcare, but that the retirees
would not have to make any contributions for healthcare until a date beyond the expiration of the then current CBA.463 These letters necessarily
and completely refute any suggestion that CNH's obligation expired with
the CBA under the "concurrent" clause of the CBA as well as any notion
that the CBAs are "silent" as to the duration of retiree healthcare benefits.
Nevertheless, Judge Sutton provided his spin on these letters, one
supported by no record facts. Judge Sutton concluded that these letters
simply "showed that CNN planned to provide coverage beyond the term
of the 1995 agreement, but again a commendable and hope-filled plan
does not entail a binding commitment. '46 4 Really? A contractual commitment that is not binding on the party who has unconditionally agreed
to perform it? What could be more illusory than that?
457. 2002 Shutdown Agreement, supra note 392, at 51.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 41.
460. Id. at 51.
461. Id. at 16, 25. These shutdown option sheets were produced by CNH during discovery and
are in the possession of the retirees' counsel.
462. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese IIl), 854 F.3d 877, 892 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., dissenting), rev'd583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
463. See supra notes 241-51.
464. See Reese III, 854 F.3d at 892 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
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If the FAS- 106 letters were just a "hope-filled" aspiration rather than
a binding agreement, CNH would not have fought so hard to maintain
4 65 And what of the undisputed fact
those letters in the 1998 negotiations.
that CNH did finally agree to the UAW's demand to eliminate those letters
and, thus, the post-CBA cap on CNH's continuing post-CBA obligation
to retirees? 46 6 Apparently, CNH' s obligation when the "caps" were eliminated - to pay the full cost of retiree healthcare after the post-CBA date
of the (eliminated) caps - an explicit agreement Judge Sutton and the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge - was illusory as well.
As noted above, the post-Tackett stampede to stamp out employer
obligations for retiree healthcare has resulted in absolutely bizarre decisions. In Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the CBA expressly stated that
4 67 While
retiree healthcare benefits would be provided "until your death.
acknowledging that this seemed to be an explicit promise of lifetime ben46 8
It
efits, the court rejected any such interpretation as a matter of law.
were
"retirees
the
that
meant
simply
concluded instead that the language
of9 the applicable CBA, unless death
entitled to benefits during the term' 46
"
expiration.
came before the CBA's
The most obvious problem with that analysis is that the subject was
healthcarebenefits. By definition, healthcare benefits do not survive the
death of a retiree. Hospitals and doctors do not provide healthcare benefits to deceased retirees. Construing "until death" as Grove did, renders
the phrase superfluous and therefore meaningless. If "until death" means
anything in the context in which it was used, it means "until death" notwithstanding the expiration of the CBA. But, even if "until death" could
act as a "limiting" provision, the court must still consider that it could be
a "right-granting" provision, 470 one that survives the general durational
465. See supra notes 252-59.
466. Reese v. CNH Global N.V., 2007 WL 2484989, *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2007).
467. Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 455, 461 (M.D. Pa. 2016), aft'd, 694 Fed.
Appx. 864 (3d Cir. 2017).
468. Id. at 477.
469. Id. In Grove, the court concluded that it had to follow the Third Circuit's "clear and express" language rule enunciated in U.A. W. v. Skinner Engine Co., despite Justice Ginsberg's concurrence noting that, under Litton, an employer's obligations can survive the expiration of a CBA based
on either "explicit" or "implicit" promises. Grove, 176 F. Supp.3d at 469-70 n. 2; see also U.A.W. v.
Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139 (3d Cir.1999). Because there is no "clear and express" standard in "ordinary" contract law, it is hard to see how that standard survived Tackett. Of course, because
Tackett and Reese deliberately emasculated the actual holding of Litton, and subsequent courts have
elevated the duration clause to presumptive status, it hardly matters that "express" durational provisions such as "until death" are rendered meaningless.
470. Id. at 477 (citing Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1997)). The
proposition that the-phrase "until death" does not automatically vest benefits but "can be construed
either as a limiting or right-granting provision." Id. Because "death" itself is limiting, there is no
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clause, and which then requires the court to determine the actual intent of
the parties.
-; . ..
.
The Second Circuit has not gone so far as to ignore "express" language of a long-term obligation. In Kelly v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., the employer and its successors had continued to provide healthcare benefits for
retirees of a closed plant for 18 years, until Tackett caused the Honeywell
to re-evaluate its predecessor's obligation.4 7 ' The district court held that
the language "for the life of the retiree or surviving spouse" means just
that-notwithstanding a general termination clause in the collectively bargained insurance agreement.47 2 The Second Circuit agreed.4 7 3 In rejecting
the argument that the general duration clause prevailed, the court noted
the Litton exception (omitted in Tackett and Reese) that "[r]ights which
accrued or vested under the agreement will, as a general rule, survive ter4 74
mination of the agreement.5
In Reese, the 1998 GBP provided that CNH agreed to pay the full
cost of the defined healthcare benefits while employees and surviving
spouses were "eligible for or receiving" a pension benefit. 475 Every other
bit of evidence informs and supports that this is exactly what CNH agreed
to in 1971 and what, during the following decades, CNH always understood its obligation to be. In short-circuiting the process informed by the
ordinary rules of contract interpretation by applying the "plain meaning"
rule to exclude probative evidence, the Supreme Court in Reese ignored
its primary function - to determine what the parties actually intended.
H. Contracts ContainingNo Provisionsas to Duration OfAn
Obligation Will Be Construedto Operate For a Reasonable
Time, Determined With Due ConsiderationofAll Factors
Involved
In Tackett, the Court cited Corbin for the proposition that contracts
that are silent as to the duration of an obligation will not ordinarily be
treated as "operative in perpetuity" but only for "a reasonable time. '47 6
As usual, the Court gave short shrift to the appropriate analysis.
need to use the term other than as a "right-granting" provision, that is "until death" regardless of the
expiration of the CBA.
471. Kelly v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 933 F. 3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2019).
472. Id. at 183.
473. Id.
474. Id.at 182 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991)).
475. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C,supra note 130, at 65.
476. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 441 (2015) (citing CORBIN, supra
note 95, § 553).
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First,the predicate that Corbin was addressing - where the contract
had no durational provisions as to an obligation - did not exist in either
Tackett or Reese. In Tackett, as the concurrence noted, the obligation
a pension and "until death or remarlasted while a retiree was "receiving"
47 7
spouse.
surviving
a
for
riage"
Reese, following Judge Sutton's lead, characterized the GBP as be4 78 This is another odd turning "silent" as to the duration of the benefits.
around for Judge Sutton who, in Reese I concluded that the retirees were
entitled to summary judgment based on the "plain language" of the 1998
GBP. 4 79 By Reese III, this "plain language" somehow morphed into "silence."
The operative language of the GBPs did not change over the years.
Under the heading "Provisions Applicable to Employees Retired on Company Pension and Surviving Spouses Receiving Company Pension," the
1998 GBP provided: "Employees who retire under the Case Corporation
Pension Plan for Hourly Paid Employees after 7/1/94, or their surviving
spouses eligible to receive a spouse's pension under the provisions of that
Plan, shall be eligible for the Group [healthcare480and life insurance] benefits as described in the following paragraphs."
In Reese I, Judge Sutton agreed that this language was "nearly identical" to that which the district court in Yolton held was "express" language tying eligibility for retiree health care to eligibility for a lifetime
pension. 4 8 1 In Yolton, the Sixth Circuit held that this "plain language of
the CBAs requires us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
In Reese 1, Judge Sutton
"..."482
discretion by issuing the injunction .
483
and a "promise,"
"commitment"
a
as
language
very
characterized this
noting further that, as in Yolton, the 1998 GBP contains "language

477. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). At oral argument in Tackett, the first
comment from the bench, by Justice Ginsberg, was "[blut the - we're dealing with a case where there
isn't silence." Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
Throughout oral argument, the Justices and counsel discussed the CBA's durational language. Id. at
18, 19, 32, 40, 41, 43.
, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018), with Reese
478. Compare CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S.
2017) (Sutton, J., dissenting), rev'd, 583
Cir.
(6th
889
877,
F.3d
854
II1),
(Reese
N.V.
v. CNH Indus.
U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).
479. Reese v. CNH Am. LLC (Reese1), 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd,583 U.S._,
138 S.Ct. 761 (2018).
480. Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 65.
481. Reese L 574 F.3d at 322.
482. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 2006).
483. Reese 1, 574 F.3d at 322.
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concerning entitlement to benefits upon retirement; it ties eligibility for
health benefits to eligibility for a pension., 48 4
How did "express" and "plain" language - language that contained
an explicit "promise" and an express "commitment" - become "silence?"
To deprive the words the parties themselves chose of all meaning by judicially rendering them "silent" is to judicially negate any "commitment"
made and to relieve one party of the "promise" those words express.
Second, unlike Tackett, Corbin did not equate "in perpetuity" with
"lifetime." 485 To the contrary, Corbin saw those concepts as distinct. In
the very section cited by Tackett, Corbin used an example of a sales contract containing a provision that "no other lot in the tract shall ever be sold
for less than $1,000. ''486 Corbin stated that a court could avoid construing
those words as a perpetual obligation by interpreting them as one lasting
a lifetime; as "meaning only that the promoter himself will never, during
his life, sell any lot for less than $1,000.,,487
Third,Corbin's solution, when there was no durational provision for
an obligation, was to construe the obligation as "operative for 'a reasonable time' to be determined as a question of fact with due consideration to
all factors involved. 4 8 8 Of course, Corbin was not thinking about CBAs
and the factors involved when considering the duration of retirement benefits. Thus, even if this contract principle were pertinent, when the issue
is retiree healthcare, "factors" that must be given due consideration are
language in the CBA that provides benefits "until death," or "until death
or remarriage," or language that "ties" healthcare benefits to a lifetime
pension and other durationallanguage conferring other long term benefits
on retirees, employees and spouses.48 9 It must include evidence of what
the parties themselves thought their obligation to mean.4 9 ° It must include
the reality that employees work through many CBAs to earn eligibility for
healthcare in retirement. It must include due consideration of whether
benefits only to the end of the current CBA are "reasonable" in light of
484. Id. at 323.
485. See CORBN, supranote 95, § 553 at 212-213. Neither did the Seventh Circuit. See Bidlack
v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The obligation for which the plaintiffs
contend in this suit is not perpetual, because retired people and their widows (or widowers) do not
live forever.").
486. CORBIN, supra note 95, § 553 at 213.
487. Id. (emphasis added).
488. Id. § 553 at 216.
489. See generally UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Resolution
of the UAW's claim of lifelong insurance benefits for retirees requires interpretation of key contractual language in the collective bargaining agreement.").
490. See id. ("[T]he court should first look to the explicit language of the collective bargaining
agreement for clear manifestations of intent.").
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these factors and the common understanding (at least before Tackett)1that
49 Of
retiree healthcare benefits are a kind of deferred compensation.
course, these are among the factors that Yard-Man and its Sixth Circuit
progeny considered in their determination of what the parties considered
duration of the employer's obligation for retiree
to be a "reasonable"
492
healthcare.
On this issue, Williston quoted at length from Warner-Lambert
PharmaceuticalCo. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc.,493 where the issue was how
long the makers of Listerine were required to pay royalties to the company
49 4
At the time of the dispute, the
that had developed the original formula.
years. 49 5 The district court
seventy-five
obligation had been in effect for
cautioned against "re-writing" a contract based on an "indiscriminate application" of the word "perpetuity," stating:
Contracts which provide no fixed date for the termination of the promisor's obligation but condition the obligation upon an event which would
necessarily terminate the contract are in quite a different category and it
is in this category that the... agreements fall. On the face of the agreeis conditioned upon the continued manments the obligation.., to pay
4 96
Listerine.
of
sale
or
ufacture
Likewise, the GBPs at issue here expressly condition payment of retiree healthcare benefits on an event stated in the contract itself - the period that a retiree or surviving spouse is "eligible for" or "receiving" a
company pension. 49 7 Or, at the very least, that is a "fairly plausible" interpretation of the contract language. As the district court stated in
nothing unreasonable or irrational about imWarner-Lambert, "[t]here is4 98
posing such an obligation."

491. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404
is
U.S. 157, 180 (1971); see also Summary of Statement No. 106, supra note 229 ("Since payment
comthat
for
obligation
employer's
The
compensation.
deferred, the benefits are a type of deferred
pensation is incurred as employees render the services necessary to earn postretirement benefits.").
492. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480-82.
493. See generally Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 660
(S.D. N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating the issue as whether plaintiff's contractual obligation to make payments to the defendants had terminated).
494. WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 31.5.
495. Warner-Lambert, 178 F. Supp. at 657.
496. Id.at 661-62.
497. See Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 65.
498. Warner-Lambert, 178 F. Supp. at 663.
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I.

Final Comments On A CeremonialInterpretationof CBAs

Given that "intent" is often subjective and contract language is an
imperfect means of expressing what people "intend," contracts are often
messy things. 4 99 That is especially true with CBAs, which are contracts
that necessarily address the whole range of subjects governing the employment relationship for an entire workforce in a single document.50 0 In
most situations, courts are not equipped to address and reconcile all of the
messy complexity of details arising from a "mature" CBA.5 °1 It is not
surprising that pertinent facts are ignored when courts attempt to boil
things down into a more simplified, coherent analysis. Courts often cite
what "facts" they deem sufficient to support their decision, ignoring factual details entirely or simply referring to them obliquely. That certainly
was the problem with the majority opinion in Reese III, something that
Judge Sutton took full advantage of when he selectively employed Section
4A of the 1998 CBA, the group insurance "concurrent" clause, as a durational clause and "all anyone needs to know to decide this case. '50 2
That, of course, does not excuse indifferent, negligent factual or legal
analysis. When the Supreme Court decided to review Reese III, the CNH
retirees had a right to a full, fair, and impartial treatment of their claims.
By now, it should be apparent that the Supreme Court in Reese, relying
on Judge Sutton's intentionally distorted analysis of the facts, provided
only a ceremonial application of selected ordinary principles of contract
interpretation instead of the full legal process they were due. Worse, by
its summary reversal, the Court foreclosed any opportunity for the retirees
to point out the many flaws in the Court's ceremonial approach to "ordinary principles" of contract law.

499. See supra notes 93-110.
500. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).
501. Id. at 581-82 ("The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance [as an arbitrator chosen by the parties], because
he cannot be similarly informed.").
502. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese III), 854 F.3d 877, 889 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., dissenting), rev'd583 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. 761 (2018).
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V.

TA CKETT' S INFERENCE CONFLATION-"INFERENCE"
IS NOT A DIRTY WORD IN CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION

A.

TACKETT 'S CONFLATION OF THE YARD-MAN "INFERENCE"

In Yard-Man, the discussion of a "contextual" or "status" inference
favoring vesting came at the conclusion of the Yard-Man analysis, and
only after the court had already determined the intent of the parties by
5°3
But, in
looking for contract indicia of intent within the CBA itself.
Tackett, the Court went far beyond what had been considered the "Yardlater
Man inference" to condemn the entire analysis of Yard-Man and
50 4
"inferences."
unsupportable
of
series
a
as
decisions
Sixth Circuit
In Yard-Man, the court initially stated that "traditional rules for contractual interpretation" apply as long as they are consistent with federal
labor policies. 50 5 A "court should first look to the explicit language of the
collective bargaining agreement for clear manifestations of intent," keeping in mind that "even the most explicit language can, of course, only be
rise to its inclusion."506
understood in light of the context which gave
Each CBA provision should be interpreted "consistently with the entire
document and the relative positions and purposes of the parties."507 Labor
agreements should be construed so as to render no terms "nugatory" and
50 8
Where ambiguities exist, the court "may
to "avoid illusory promises."
in the CBA "for guidance;" "[v]ariations
phrases"
and
words
other
look to
in language used in other durational provisions of the agreement may, for
example, provide inferences of intent useful in clarifying a provision
50 9
Applying these principles, the
whose intended duration is ambiguous."
intended retiree
Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parties
5 10
expiration.
CBA's
the
beyond
extend
to
health benefits
Yard-Man did not end its discussion with this conclusion based on
the language of the CBA itself. Instead, as a "final" point, the Sixth Circuit explained that the context in which retiree benefits were negotiated
supported its conclusion. The court recounted the legal fact that retiree
benefits are permissive subjects of bargaining and, in light of this, it was
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 442 (2015).
Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1480.
Id.(emphasis added).
Id.
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"unlikely that such benefits, which are typically understood'as a form of
delayed compensation," would be left to "the contingencies of future ne51
gotiations." 1
Only then, as a "further" point, Yard-Man stated that retiree benefits
are in a sense "status" benefits that carry an inference that they are intended to last as long as the prerequisite status-retirement lasts. 5 12 YardMan concluded that retiree healthcare benefits were not "interminable by
their nature" and added:
Nor does any federal labor policy.., presumptively favor the finding of
interminable rights to retiree insurance benefits when the collective bargaining agreement is silent. Rather, as part of the context from which
the collective bargaining agreement arose, the nature of such benefits
simply provides another inference of intent. Standing alone, [that contextual inference] would be insufficient to find an intent to create interminable benefits. In the present case, however, this contextual factor
buttresses the already sufficient evidence of such intent in the language
of [the CBA].5 13
It was this extra-contractual "inference" of Yard-Man, gleaned from
the general context of federal labor law and the "status" of retirement that
became known as the Yard-Man inference. 5 14 This inference was attacked
by employers repeatedly over the years, 5 15 generally rejected by other Circuits, 5 16 and criticized by Judge Sutton in his Noe dissent as effectively a
511. Id. at 1482.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 2008); Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,
520 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2008); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir.
2006); Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2000); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc.,
190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654 (6th Cir. 1996).
515. See, e.g., Cole, 549 F.3d at 1074 (stating that defendant employers contended that cases
involving the utilization of the Yard-Man inferences were "wrongly decided"); Yolton, 435 F.3d at
579 ("[The Yard-Man] inference has caused much consternation for employers."): Maurer, 212 F.3d
at 917 (stating that defendant employer argued that lower court erred in its application of the YardMan inference); Golden, 73 F.3d at 654-55 (stating employer argued that the court should modify the
Yard-Man inference).
516. See Senior v. NSTAR Electric and Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 217 n.16 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating plaintiffs argued that the standard the 6th Circuit Court used in Yard-Man would require an inference in favor of vesting benefits, however, the court felt that "[i]t is doubtful that Yard-Man itself
stands for the broad rule that plaintiffs ascribe to it"); UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130,
14041 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e disagree with Yard-Man to the extent that it recognizes an inference of
an intent to vest."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d
228, 231 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]his circuit questioned the [Yard-Man] inference."); Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 606-07 (7th Cir. 1993) (reinstating the Seventh Circuit's position that
there is no presumption that health benefits vest on retirement); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus.,
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"presumption" that benefits vest.5 17 By the time Reese I was decided in
2009, the Yard-Man inference had been demoted by Judge Sutton himself,
to "nothing more than this: a nudge in favor
in a typically piquant phrase,
5 18
cases."
of vesting in close
In Tackett, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
the conflict between the circuits relating to the Yard-Man inference, something it had refused to on many occasions in the past. 5 19 Mindful of how
toxic the Yard-Man inference had become, the Tackett retirees basically
abandoned it in their brief.520 At the hearing, counsel for the retirees assured the Supreme Court that the retirees would welcome a remand to
prove a contractual right to lifetime health care benefits under "ordinary"
interpretation without relying on any extra-contracprinciples of contract
52 1
tual "inference."
In Tackett, the Court emphatically rejected the Yard-Man inference,
noting that, while a court could look at extra-contractual evidence such as
industry practices, there must be concrete evidence to support such an inference, and it cannot be the kind of general conceptions referenced in
522 In the proYard-Man in support of its additional inference of vesting.
cess, the "Yard-Man inference" somehow became synonymous with
Yard-Man's entire legal analysis. Thus, in Tackett, the extra-contractual
"Yard-Man inference" had morphed into the "Yard-Man inferences,"
demonstrated by Tackett's criticism of Yard-Man's analysis of the illusory
promises doctrine and of post-Yard-Man decisions that had accorded
836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[WMe disagree with Yard-Man to the extent that it recognizes
an inference of an intent to vest."). But see Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989)
("Surely the parties to the collective bargaining agreement realized that employees who are willing to
forego current compensation in expectation of retiree benefits 'would want assurances that once they
retire they will continue to receive such benefits."') (quoting Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).
517. Noe, 520 F.3d at 567-68 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
518. Reese v. CNH Am. LLC (Reese]), 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 583 U.S._,
138 S.Ct. 761 (2018).
519. See Moore v. Menasha Corp., 690 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1250
(2013); Bender v. Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., 681 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568
U.S. 943 (2012); Rose v. Volvo Const. Equip. N.A., 331 Fed. Appx. 388 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 970 (2010); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1019 (2006); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1067 (2000); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 807 (1996); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,475
U.S. 1017; and UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007
(1984).
520. In its reply, the petitioner stated that "[R]espondents try to put as much distance as they can
between Yard-Man and the judgment in this case." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, M&G Polymers
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2016) (No. 13-1010).
521. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 477, at 26.
522. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 439 (2015).
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weight to actual contractual provisions that tied eligibility for health care
523
benefits to eligibility for pension.
The concurrence, in what seemed to be a disguised dissent, stressed
the limits of the majority decision, noting that traditional concepts of contract interpretation looked at the "entire agreement," that, vested rights
could be implied as well as explicit, and that language tying the eligibility
for health care benefits to pensions or a consideration of other durational
provisions in the CBA could illuminate the meaning of the retiree health
524
care provisions.
However valid (or invalid) Tackett's criticism of the "tying" analysis
may otherwise be, that analysis does not involve any extra-contractual inference. The language "tying" eligibility for healthcare benefits to pensions comes directly from the 1998 GBP itself - and from the express
language conferring health care benefits on retirees 525 - and either defines
eligibility for a limited benefit, as employers' argued, or discloses the duration of that benefit, as retirees argued. It is not much of an."inference,"
for example, to deduce that when the CBA provides a retiree is entitled to
healthcare benefits if she is "receiving a pension," that the employer's
contractual obligation is to provide healthcare benefits for the duration of
time that the retiree is receiving a pension.
Likewise, any comparative analysis of CBA language conferring
other benefits on active employees (or on their spouses) with language
conferring retiree healthcare benefits is based on specific provisions of
the CBA.52 6 Such a comparison of contractual language is certainly not
"extra-contractual," the supposed defect in the Yard-Man status inference
52 7
analysis.
B. DRA WING INFERENCES OFINTENT FROM OTHER ESTABLISHED
FACTS IS COMMON PRACTICE iN THE CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION

What is missing from the Tackett/Reese approach is any consideration of just what an inference is and the critical and legitimate function

523. Id. at 428,438.
524. Id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
525. See Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C, supra note 130, at 65.
526. See supra notes 167-81.
527. See Tackett, 574 U.S. at 438-39 ("Yard-Man's assessment of likely behavior in collective
bargaining is too speculative and too far removed from the context of any particular contract to be
I
useful in discerning the parties' intention.").
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inferences play in "ordinary" rules of contract interpretation.5 2 8 According to Black's Law Dictionary, an inference involves the "process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced
as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already
proved or admitted., 529 In other words, when the parties' intent is not
clear on the face of a contract, contractual interpretation involves drawing
inferences about intent - guessing at what the parties meant based on what
they said in other parts of the written agreement, from the context in which
the agreement was negotiated or from the parties' practices in administering the agreement.
The Supreme Court, in Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., noted that
interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alteriusemploys the "inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence." 5 30 In Cramer Products, Inc. v. International Comfort
Products,Ltd., the Tenth Circuit stated that the ordinary contract rule favoring specific over general provisions is premised on the "reasonable inference... that the specific provisions express more exactly what the parties intended. '5 3 1 InPacific PortlandCement Co. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that a "deduction" of the parties'
intent was warranted from their conduct subsequent to the execution of
the contract and before the controversy arose. 532 In re Am Trust Financial
Corp., the Sixth Circuit stated that: "making inferences from circumstanperformance is standard procedure
tial evidence and the parties' course 5of
33
in construing ambiguous contracts."
Yard-Man's inquiry into the "context in which these benefits arose"
is, like all other matters of contract interpretation, based upon inference. 53 4 But, it was premised directly on Brennan's concurrence in America Manufacturing that "[w]ords in a collective bargaining agreement...
are to be understood only by reference to the background which gave rise
to their inclusion." 5 35 And, Yard-Man relied explicitly on PittsburghPlate
Glass for the "context" in which retiree health care benefits are negotiated
528. See generallyHillman, supra note 91, at 309-10 (discussing the role of inferences and presumptions in contract enforcement in the context of Yard-Man and Tackett).
529. Inference, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1lth ed. 2019).
530. Barnhart, Comtm'r of Soc. Sec. v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).
531. Cramer Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Comfort Prods., Ltd., No. 90-3151, 1991 WL 68892, at *5 (10th
Cir. 1991) (quoting Desbien v. Penokee Framers Union Co-op. Ass'n, 522 P.2d 917, 923 (Kan.
1976)).
532. Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 554 (9th Cir.
1949).
533. In re Amtrust Fin. Corp., 694 F.3d 741, 757 (6th Cir. 2012).
534. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
535. Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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- as permissive subjects of bargaining and a form of delayed compensation. 536 Tackett missed or simply ignored the contextual aspect of the
Yard-Man analysis, which is not surprising given Tackett's failure to cite
American Manufacturingand PittsburghPlate Glass or analyze the concepts those cases addressed.5 3 7
In Reese III, the majority focused on the CBA language and agreed
with the district court's post-Tackett analysis that, based solely on the
terms of the CBA itself, there was at least ambiguity as to the parties'
intent, ambiguity resolved by the unequivocal extrinsic evidence favoring
the retirees' interpretation. 5 38 The majority in Reese Ill employed no ex5 39
tra-contractual "inferences."
No matter. The Supreme Court summarily reversed, siding unequivocally with Judge Sutton's factual misrepresentations that the insurance
"concurrent" clause was all anyone - at least any judge-needed to
know. 540 In doing so, the Court asserted that the Sixth Circuit was still
employing the outlawed "Yard-Man inferences," consistently using the
plural form. 54 1 In the process, the Court relegated specific language relating to the duration of retiree health care benefits - the language tying eligibility for retiree healthcare to eligibility for or receipt of a lifetime pension - subservient to the more general,and selectively cited, "concurrent"
provision of the CBA.5 42
Incredibly, the Court stated that the 1998 CBA was "silent" on the
duration of retiree health care benefits. 54 3 This assertion of "silence" was
critical to the Court's elevation of the general durational clause to presumptive status. But, when the GBP states that retirees and their surviving
spouses are eligible for healthcare benefits if they are "eligible for" or
"receiving" pension benefits, it is the opposite of silence. Both eligibility
and receipt of pension benefits are durational concepts. Thus, this
536. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; see also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 180-82 (1971).
537. In Tackett, the Court discounted any reliance on the permissive/mandatory bargaining subject dichotomy, noting that in the case before it, the parties had agreed to make retiree benefits a
mandatory subject of bargaining. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 439 (2015).
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, however, the Court concluded that the fact that it was an established industry practice to bargain over retiree healthcare did not alter is conclusion about the status of retirees
in bargaining. PittsburghPlate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 176.
538. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese I11), 854 F.3d 877, 882-83 (6th Cir. 2017), rev'd, 583
U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 761 (2018).
539. Id.
540. CNH Indus. N.V.v. Reese, 583 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 761, 766 (2018).
541. Id. at 762, 763, 764, 765, 766.
542. Id. at 766.
543. Id.
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contractual language - previously interpreted as clear evidence of intent
in Reese I and in Cole5 4 4 - still could be "fairly" interpreted to mean that,
as long as that person is eligible for or receiving pension benefits, he/she
is eligible for healthcare benefits. 54 5 In fact, neither an inference nor ordinary rules of contract interpretation seem remotely necessary to this "plain
meaning" reading, which may be why the Sixth Circuit had historically
found such language so probative. 546 The Reese retirees and surviving
spouses are still eligible for and/or receiving a lifetime pension. But, they
have been deprived of the healthcare that the GBPs tied to pension eligibility.
Likewise, the FAS 106 Letters, which capped CNH's obligation for
retiree healthcare, but only after the expiration of the CBA, were collectively bargained and spoke explicitly to the duration of that obligation, as
54 7
The only
did the negotiated 1998 elimination of that post-CBA cap.
way to maintain that the CBA was "silent" on the issue of the duration of
retiree healthcare benefits was to silence those and other durational proas Judge Sutton did, by calling
visions of the CBA by ignoring them - or
54 8
illusory.
therefore
and
them aspirational
The final irony, for retirees at least, is that the Reese plaintiffs disclaimed any reliance on the Yard-Man inference from the very beginning,
as they did in the parallel Yolton litigation. 549 The disclaimer was in recognition both of the disputed nature of the inference and the perceived
strength of the facts, based on the express CBA language and the unequivocal extrinsic evidence - in words and deeds - of CNH's intent to provide
lifetime healthcare benefits for retirees. In the end, the benefits that CNH
had so clearly promised for life were lost on the basis of a summary reversal that cannot be justified under "ordinary" principles of contract interpretation or on any objective analysis of the actual facts.

544. Reese v. CNH America LLC (Reese 1), 574 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd 583 U.S.
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018); Cole v. Arvinmeritor Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 2008).
545. See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 444 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
546. See generally Cole, 549 F.3d at 1075 (an opinion by the Sixth Circuit stating, "[h]ere, unlike
the facts in North Bend, the parties expressed their intent in unambiguous contract language"); Yolton
v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 471, 580 (6th Cir. 2006); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73
F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1996).
547. See supra notes 241-59.
548. See supra notes 462-64.
549. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Reese), supra
note 222, at 8 n.7; Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Liability (Yolton), supra note 377, at 9 n.7.
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VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PER CURIAMREVERSAL
BASED ON THE REESE IIIDISSENT
For the author, who had spent fifteen years navigating the Yolton and
Reese retirees through the shoals of hard fought, well-financed litigation
- litigation that resulted in decision after decision from the district court
based on actual facts - the per curiam reversal based on a misrepresentation of "facts" was a devastating blow. When he finally mustered the fortitude to closely read the Reese decision, 550 the author was stunned to
learn that the Supreme Court had uncritically accepted Judge Sutton's dissent as the basis for its decision.
There are hints as to how this could have happened. Judge Sutton
was a well-regarded clerk for Justice Powell and then for Justice Scalia;
he was one of Judge Scalia'sfavoriteclerks. 55 ' In turn, Judge Sutton has

been one of the more prolific "feeder" judges, sending ten law clerks to
the Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014.552 Kirkland & Ellis attorneys
K. Winn Allen and Craig Primis authored an amicus brief for the ERISA
Industry Committee supporting the employers' position in both Tackett
554
and Reese. 553 Mr. Allen clerked for Judge Sutton and then Justice Alito.
Mr. Primis clerked for Justice Thomas, who wrote Tackett.55 5 These circumstances may have engendered (or represented) a symbiotic relationship that affected how both the Justices and clerks viewed Judge Sutton's
opinions.

550. The author was not involved in the litigation by the time Reese III was decided.
551. Adam Liptak, On the Bench and Off, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html ("'One of my former clerks
whom I am the most proud of now sits on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' in Cincinnati [Justice
Scalia] said, referring to Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton.").
552. Alexandra G. Hess, The Collapse of the House that Ruth Built: The Impact of the Feeder
System on Female Judges and the FederalJudiciary, 1970-2014, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 61, 100 n.137 (2015).
553. Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee and the American Benefits Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 131010); Motion for Leave to File and Brief of ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018) (No. 17-515) [hereinafter ERISA Motion for Leave]; see also About ERIC, ERIC, https://www.eric.org/about-eric/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019) ("Only [ERISA Industry Committee] provides the combination of intel, expertise, collaboration, and lobbying that exclusively serves the interests of large employers who provide
health, retirement, and compensation benefits to their nationwide workforce.").. .
554. K. Winn Allen, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, www.kirkland.com/lawyers/a/allen-k-winn (last visited
Nov. 20, 2019).
555. Young Guns, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (July 1, 2006), https://www.kirkland.com/news/in-thenews/2006/07/young-guns; see also Tackett, 574 U.S. at 429 (noting that Justice Thomas delivered
the opinion of the Court).
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Bobby Burchfield, CNH's attorney for a decade in Reese, also had
written an amicus brief for the National Association of Manufacturers in
Tackett.556 Mr. Burchfield was a long-time Republican operative, who
had served as General Counsel to the George H.W. Bush reelection campaign, was appointed by George W. Bush to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, and served as Ethics Advisor for the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust. 55 7 There are many additional connections, which go beyond
the scope of this article that might explain the blind faith, if that is what it
and their clerks had in CNH's arguments
was, the conservative Justices
55 8
and Judge Sutton's views.
556. See Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V. (Reese 111), 854 F.3d 877, 878 (6th Cir. 2017), rev'd, 583
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018); Reese v. CNH Am. LLC, 227 F.R.D. 483,485 (E.D. Mich. 2005),
U.S. _,
138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).; see also Brief of National Association of Manufacturers
rev'd, 583 U.S.,_
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, No. 13-1010 (U.S.).
557. Bobby R. Burchfield, KING & SPALDING, www.kslaw.com/people/bobby-burchfield (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019).
558. See 2017 Annual Report, FEDERALIST SOC'Y (Apr. 9 2018), https://fedsoc-cms-public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/MvqGg29Q8lNillcwowGDQLsgpEPHGmkvUxyjlAys.pdf
[hereinafter Annual Report]. In its 2017 Annual Report, the Federalist Society highlighted many past
events, including "Celebrating Justice Thomas: 25 Years on the Supreme Court" and a discussion on
"Interpreting State Constitutions," featuring Judge Sutton. Id. at 8, 22. Justice Gorsuch gave a speech
at the Antonin Scalia Memorial Dinner, which was attended by Justice Alito, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell and then Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Id. at 32, 33, 57, 58. Justice Thomas and
several high ranking Trump administration officials either spoke at, attended or were highlighted at
the National Convention including Vice President Pence, Chief of Staff Mulvaney, former Labor
Secretary Acosta, former EPA Administrator Pruitt, Kellyanne Conway, former White House Counsel McGahn and Transportation Secretary Chao. Id. at 21, 32, 33, 39, 58. Contributors to the Federalist Society in 2017 included Mr. Burchfield; Allyson Ho (who argued Tackett for M&G Polymers);
Kathryn Todd (former clerk for Justice Thomas and Chamber of Commerce attorney on amicus brief
in Tackett); Steven Lehotsky (attorney on Chamber of Commerce amicus brief in Tackett and former
Scalia clerk); the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (amicus in Tackett and Reese); Winston & Strawn
(counsel for the Chamber of Commerce in Tackett); Kirkland & Ellis (counsel for amicus ERISA
Industry Committee in Reese); Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (counsel for M&G Polymers in Tackett);
Mayer Brown (counsel for amicus Whirlpool in Reese); Jones Day (counsel for amici Chamber of
Commerce et al, in Reese) and Ogeltree Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart (counsel for amicus Council on Labor Law Equality in Tackett). Id. at 48, 49, 50; see also Tackett, 574 U.S. at 429; Kate
Comerford Todd, FEDERALIST SoC'Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/kate-todd (last visited Nov. 20,
2019); Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (No. 13-1010); Steven Lehotsky,
FEDERALIST Soc'Y, https:/fedsoc.org/contributors/steven-lehotsky (last visited Nov. 20, 2019);
ERISA Motion for Leave, supra note 553; Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief
Amicus Curia for Whirlpool Corporation in Support of Petitioners, CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 583
U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018) (No. 17-515); Motion and Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, the National Association of Manufacturers, American Benefits Council,
, 138 S.
and the Business Roundtable as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Reese, 583 U.S.
Ct. 761 (No. 17-515); Brief of the Council on Labor Law Equality and the Society for Human Resource Management as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner M&G Polymers USA, LLC, Tackett,
574 U.S. 427 (No. 13-1010). The Federalist Society describes itself as a "group of conservatives and
libertarians" who place a premium on the "rule of law." Annual Report, supra note 558, at 3. It was
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From the standpoint of a cynical union lawyer. like the author, none
of this is all that surprising. Unions have hardly been the beneficiaries of
the largesse of "conservative" Justices. What was bewildering, and to the
author most heart-rending, was the silence of the four "liberal" Justices in
Reese.5 59 The absence of even a hint of protest is striking and strikingly
disappointing. Because one must not infer that indolence, indifference,
incompetence, ignorance or nafvet6 explains the failure of four Justices of
the United States Supreme Court to probe beneath the surface of Judge
Sutton's dissent - or at least suggest that the retirees should be given the
opportunity to do so - the alternative possible rationales for their silence
are chilling. Did these paragons of liberal democratic thought (in the classic and contemporary sense) actually know what was happening and what
they were doing and, hiding behind a per curiam decision, not care enough
to even note the travesty? 560 Or, do they have no interest in the welfare of
working class Americans? Or, perhaps, given that the issue was simply
one of "contract interpretation," were they reserving their influence and
dissents for more "important" issues?
VII.

CONCLUSION

Courts have developed principles of contract interpretation to guide
the attempt to discern the actual intent of the contracting parties in dispute.
That goal is, most lawyers and legal scholars agree, the "cardinal rule" of
contract interpretation: It is the raison d'etre for judicial intervention in
56 1
and resolution of contract disputes.
In Tackett and Reese, the Supreme Court engaged in a ceremonial
application of some "ordinary principles" of contract interpretation, an
exercise that precluded consideration of a wealth of relevant and compelling evidence of intent. After Tackett, and especially after Reese, lower
courts must now apply, in place of "ordinary" principles of contract
founded on the principle that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the
law is, not what it should be." Id. Whether Federalist Society members should be proud of Tacketi
and Reese depends on how seriously they view these foundational principles.
559. Reese, 583 U.S. _,

138 S.Ct. at 762.

560. See Ira P. Robbins, HidingBehind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per
Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1197, 1210-11 (2012) ("Thomas Jefferson likely would have
agreed, because the per curiam 'shield[s] the [Justices] compleatly [sic].' He argued that '[t]he practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest, & the incompetent."') (alterations in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
561. See WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 32.14 (noting that the "purpose of judicial interpretation
is to ascertain the parties' intentions"); see also KNIFFIN, supra note 80, § 24.7 ("The cardinal rule
with which all interpretation begins is that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of
the parties.").
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interpretation, a shabby substitute - an almost irrebuttable presumption
that retiree healthcare benefits do not survive the expiration of the CBA
regardless of the actual evidence of what the parties intended. Of course,
courts have always selectively manipulated "ordinary" rules and the pur5 62
ported "facts" to reach a desired result. But, that is the antithesis of the
legitimate function of the judiciary; it is the antithesis of the impartial
56 3 When the Su"Rule of Law" that is the bedrock of our democracy.
preme Court engages in this kind of unseemly behavior, and does it so
blatantly as in Reese, confidence in the Court as the impartial arbiter of
last resort should and must be questioned. The best response is a direct
and comprehensive - a distinctly non-ceremonial - inquiry into what happened.
When the Supreme Court makes controversial decisions on issues of
importance, legal scholars question and analyze the Court's
Constitutional
"legitimacy.'"564 Because the Court is comprised of individual justices,
whose individual political and judicial views vary widely, even within
ideological spectrums, the concept of the Court's "legitimacy" is interplay out over time
twined with, and affected by, those views and how 56they
5
issues.
disparate
in individual decisions involving
None of these weighty matters were involved here. Tackett and Reese
dealt with the mundane task of interpreting a collective bargaining agreement. No evolving question of Constitutional law, or of a fundamental
personal or political right, was implicated in the inquiry or the result. But
can the Supreme Court be trusted to decide any dispute impartially in the
wake of decisions as "ordinary" as Tackett and Reese - where the Court
ignores its own precedent, misrepresents undisputed facts, displays an
562. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9.
563. On November 29, 2018, the Sixth Circuit docketed a letter it received from a Reese retiree
about the court's refusal to reconsider its refusal to remand the case to the district court for a decision
on the meaning of the 2002 Shutdown Agreement. The letter stated, in part: "If the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals cannot even look at this Agreement, then where do we go? The court is the only and
last place we can turn to. The court is there for everyone, I thought, rich or poor, white collar or blue
collar, and justice for all. I don't believe we are asking too much, for the court to read and rule on
this Agreement separately. This was something we worked for all our lives and were promised in our
senior years. To have this taken away without one of our US courts to at least review it is a tragedy."
Letter, Kevin Diederich to [Clerk] Deborah S. Hunt, Reese v. CNH Industrial N.V., No. 15-2382 (6th
Cir.), ECF No. 89.
564.

See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce

Ackerman ed., 2002); Joshua A. Geltzer, Will the Legitimacy of the Supreme3 Court Survive the Census
Case? N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/ 1/opinion/census-citizenship-question-supreme-court-travel-ban.html.
565. Tara Leigh Grove, Book Note, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L.
REv. 2240 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
(2018)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol37/iss1/5

84

McClow: Where the Law Ends - Part 2: A Ceremonial Approach to the Interpr
WHERE THE LA WENDS

2019]

ignorance of the legal and practical context of collective bargaining and
federal labor policy and selectively (mis)applies the "ordinary" contract
principles it purports to champion? Can the Court be trusted to get the
"big" things right if get the "'little" things so wrong?
Complicating matters is that both Tackett and Reese were unanimous
decisions. 56 6 Every justice in Tackett ignored explicit Supreme Court
precedent that CBAs are not ordinary contracts. Reese was decided as a
per curiam reversal,showing that all nine Justices signed off to the theory
that the dispute was "straightforward., 56 7 What can scholars or lawyers
make of these kinds of routine decisions based on mundane contract law?
Are these decisions simply aberrations; does anyone care; and, in the end,
what does it matter?
• As to the Reese retirees, this article will be of no consolation. The
Supreme Court negated their contractual benefits to lifetime healthcare
without a hearing, based on a judicial misrepresentation of the basic, undisputed facts. For the author, who spent a majority of his career representing retirees, and more than a decade representing the Reese retirees,
this article was a necessary catharsis but no lasting comfort.
The author hopes that an impartial observer who happens to come
across this article will be appalled by Tackett and even more so by Reese.
He hopes that whatever sunlight this article casts on this particular miscarriage of justice will result in some additional critical scrutiny of every
Supreme Court decision. For the "rule of law" is nowhere to be found in
Tackett and Reese and, in the words of John Locke, engraved on the Department of Justice Building in Washington, D.C., -"wherever law ends,
5 68
tyranny begins."
VII.

POSTSCRIPT

In the early 1990's, Jim Ellis, a UAW International Representative
whom I had known and respected for years, asked me to represent a group
of retirees who had once worked for Bendix Corporation and who were
566. CNH Indus. N.V, v. Reese, 583 U.S. __ 138 S. Ct. 761,762 (2018); M&G Polymers USA,
LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 430 (2015).
567. Reese, 583 U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. at 766-67.
568.

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: IN THE FORMER, THE FALSE PRINCIPLES,

AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND His FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN,
THE LAT]ER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, bk II, §202 (Hollis ed. 1689) ("[Wherever] law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be
transgressed to another's harm... [a]nd whosoever, in authority, exceeds the power given him by the
law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which
the law allows not; ceases in that to be a magistrate...").
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receiving deferred vested pensions. The case was based on the Bendix
Guaranty, a two-page agreement, dated April 1, 1976, between Bendix
and the UAW, that protected pension and healthcare benefits for certain
employees who would be affected by the planned divestiture of certain
Bendix divisions in Michigan and New York.
The Bendix Guaranty provided that after and despite the divestiture,
Bendix would guaranty certain pension benefit payments under the Bendix Pension Plan ("the Protected Amount") and would also guaranty the
level of health care benefits provided in the 1974 CBA. The duration of
the latter obligation was for "the period of time installments of the Protected Amount are due" 569 _ another instance where retiree healthcare was
"tied" to receipt of pension benefits.
The Guaranty was not specifically limited to those employees who
retired from active employment. Instead, it defined the protected class of
employees as those who had terminated employment before the divestiture date and who, at their termination, "had at least ten years of Credited
Service under the terms of the Bendix (Pension) Plan." Based on the plain
language of the Bendix Agreement, Ellis wanted me to sue on behalf of
employees with deferred vested pension benefits, those who left employment at Bendix with a vested pension (at least ten years of credited service), but before they were eligible to retire from active employment.
Under most UAW CBAs, retiree healthcare benefits are not available
to employees who quit before they are eligible to retire from active employment. 570 But the Bendix Guaranty made no such distinction - so the
plain meaning was that all retired Bendix employees who had ten years
of service when they terminated employment, would be covered by the
Guaranty - and thus would be entitled to healthcare benefits for as long
as they received a pension.
After reviewing the Bendix Guaranty, I filed suit on behalf of two
persons receiving deferred vested pensions. 571 During discovery, an attorney for the employer and I traveled to Elmira, New York, the location of
one of the divested Bendix plants, to review local union documents.
These documents were housed in the union's office at the factory as well
as at its headquarters. After reviewing the documents at the plant, I went
569. LaForest v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., No. 03-6248T, 2003 WL 22103474, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2003) (granting summary judgment for retirees against Bendix's successor Honeywell based
on the Guaranty).
570. The CNH Group Benefit Plans, for example, have a specific provision that the retiree health
care provisions do not apply to deferred vested retirees. See Declaration of Jack Reese, Ex. 50C,
supra note 130, at 67.
571. Plaintiffs' Complaint Filed with Jury Demand at 1, Fontella v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. 9277055 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 1992).
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to the union's headquarters while the employer's attorney went to lunch.
There was a bank of metal filing-cabinets at the Local. I started leafing
through the documents by first looking at the labels on the file drawers.
I soon came across some local union newsletters in one of the files.
I looked for copies dated around the time of the 1976 Bendix Guaranty.
Almost immediately, and to my surprise, I came across the newsletter announcing the Bendix Guaranty. The newsletter said something to the effect that "of course, the Guaranty does not cover retirees receiving deferred vested benefits."
I immediately called Jordan Rossen, the UAW's General Counsel,
and told him what I had discovered. Jordan told me to do whatever I
thought was appropriate under the circumstance. After talking to him, I
replaced the newsletter in the file folder where I had found it and closed
the file drawer. When the employer's lawyer showed up, I showed him
the bank of file drawers. He started at the beginning and got nowhere close
to the drawer containing the newsletters by the time he had to leave to
catch his plane.
Shortly thereafter, I talked to Jay Whitman, another legendary UAW
lawyer, who I learned had been instrumental in drafting the Bendix Guaranty for the UAW. Jay told me that it was never the UAW's intention to
extend the healthcare guaranty to deferred vested pensioners.
With this information, and after discussing the matter with Mr. Ellis,
I called the employer's principal lawyer and told him that I had an offer
he could not refuse. If the employer provided lifetime healthcare for the
two named plaintiffs and a nominal attorney fee, I would dismiss the lawsuit. The offer was possible because the proposed class had not yet been
certified. The employer's lawyer was caught off guard but agreed that I
had indeed made him an offer he could not refuse. Shortly thereafter, we
settled the case on the proposed terms.
Neither Jay nor Jordan - nor Jim Ellis, after learning the underlying
context - suggested that I try to enforce the plain meaning of the Bendix
Guaranty. Instead, they all understood that the actual, mutual intent of the
parties was what mattered.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Jordan and Jay, who, like
Jim Ellis and so many other dedicated men and women of the UAW, devoted their lives to the pursuit of justice for working people. This article
is also dedicated to the memory of UA W v. Yard-Man, Inc., where the
Sixth Circuit wisely reminded everyone that, as to CBAs, "even the most
explicit language can, of course, only be understood in light of the context
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57 2 And finally, this article is dedicated
which gave rise to its inclusion."
to the 4,000 Reese retirees and surviving spouses who deserved so much
more from the Supreme Court.

572.

UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol37/iss1/5

88

